

SELECTED GUIDELINE APPLICATION DECISIONS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT



**Prepared by the
Office of General Counsel
United States Sentencing Commission**

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U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL

CASE ANNOTATIONS—FIFTH CIRCUIT

This document contains annotations to Fifth Circuit judicial opinions addressing some of the most commonly applied federal sentencing guidelines. The document was developed to help judges, lawyers and probation officers locate relevant authorities when applying the federal sentencing guidelines. It does not include all authorities needed to correctly apply the guidelines. Instead, it presents authorities that represent Fifth Circuit jurisprudence on selected guidelines. The document is not a substitute for reading and interpreting the actual guidelines manual; rather the document serves as a supplement to reading and interpreting the guidelines manual.

CHAPTER ONE: *Introduction and General Application Principles*

Part B General Application Principles

United States v. Miro, 29 F.3d 194 (5th Cir. 1994). “The [g]uidelines apply to all offenses committed after November 1, 1987. The [g]uideline commentary suggests grouping of mail fraud counts which comprise part of a single course of conduct with a single criminal objective representing one composite harm to the victim. We are bound by the commentary when it interprets or explains a guideline unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with or a plainly erroneous reading of that guideline. . . . [C]ourts are bound by the commentary with respect to offenses that are actually covered by the [g]uidelines themselves. Congress has made it plain that the [g]uidelines apply only to crimes committed after November 1, 1987. . . . the [g]uidelines cover some offenses initiated prior to November 1, 1987, yet completed after that date. A perfect example is a conspiracy initiated prior to November 1, 1987, but continuing by virtue of a co-conspirator’s overt act done after that date. In such a case, the conspiracy conviction is sentenced pursuant to the [g]uidelines because the crime itself would not have been completed until after November 1, 1987. Just because criminal activity takes place over a period of time does not mean it is a continuing or ‘straddle’ offense.” *Miro*, 29 F.3d at 198 (citations omitted).

§1B1.1 Application Instructions

United States v. Calbat, 266 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2001). “If there is no guideline for a particular offense . . . the court is to use ‘the most analogous offense guideline.’”

§1B1.3 Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline Range)

United States v. Brummet, 355 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2003), *cert. denied*, 541 U.S. 1003 (2004). A sentencing judge may consider non-adjudicated offenses—offenses for which the defendant has neither been charged nor convicted—that occur after the offense of conviction if they constitute relevant conduct under §1B1.3. Relevant conduct includes offenses that are sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a ongoing series of offenses. In this case, the district judge enhanced the defendant’s sentence

based on his possession of two firearms found at the time of the offense of conviction and two other firearms found during subsequent searches of the defendant's home. Although the defendant possessed the four firearms on three separate occasions within a nine month period, his pattern of behavior in possessing firearms and the time period between the offenses supported the district court's conclusion that the firearms possessions were part of an ongoing series of offenses. Thus, the district judge properly relied on the four firearms as relevant conduct in enhancing the defendant's sentence.

See United States v. Cade, 279 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2002), §4A1.3.

United States v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2001). Although relevant conduct includes all reasonably foreseeable acts of coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, the reasonable foreseeability of all drug sales does not necessarily flow from membership in a conspiracy. To calculate the quantity of drugs for participation in a drug conspiracy, the district court must determine: "(1) when the defendant joined the conspiracy; (2) the quantities of drugs that were within the scope of the agreement; and (3) the quantities the defendant could reasonably foresee being distributed by the conspiracy." *Id.* at 241. Because the evidence in this case showed that the defendant had participated in the conspiracy for nearly two years and that he could have foreseen the sale of at least one kilogram of heroin, the district judge properly relied on the one kilogram as relevant conduct in calculating the quantity of drugs.

United States v. Elizondo, 475 F.3d 692 (5th Cir. 2007). When the circuit court makes determinations on appeal that affect only whether sufficient evidence had been adduced at trial to support a conviction, the sentencing court on remand must consider all evidence to properly assess defendant's relevant conduct for sentencing purposes. The law of the case doctrine is subordinate to the *Booker* requirement that the sentencing court consider the guidelines before imposing any sentence.

United States v. Hammond, 201 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 1999). The base offense level for embezzlement is calculated based on the dollar amount of the loss caused by the embezzlement. To calculate the dollar amount of loss, the sentencing judge must determine the losses due to the defendant's own conduct as well as for those due to the defendant's relevant conduct. Under §1B1.3, a defendant's relevant conduct includes the conduct of others that was both: (1) in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity; and (2) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity. In this case, the sentencing judge failed to make specific findings that the defendant agreed with third parties to participate in an embezzling scheme, to explain how the actions of the third parties furthered any joint undertaking of criminal activity, or to indicate how those actions fell within the scope of any agreement to embezzle. As a result, the record did not demonstrate that the actions of third parties that the judge considered as relevant conduct were in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, or that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen the losses resulting from the actions of the third parties.

United States v. Levario-Quiroz, 161 F.3d 903 (5th Cir. 1998). Although a sentencing judge is not precluded from considering conduct that occurred in another country, such conduct must still meet the definition of relevant conduct to be used in calculating the defendant's

sentence. Section 1B1.3 defines relevant conduct as “all acts and omissions committed . . . or willfully caused by the defendant; and . . . that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.” In this case, the defendant did not commit the offenses that occurred in a foreign country during the commission of his crimes of conviction, in preparation for his crimes of conviction, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for his crimes of conviction. As a result, the defendant’s foreign offenses did not qualify as relevant conduct.

United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2003), *cert. denied*, 542 U.S. 927 (2004). The district court properly applied the guideline for sexual abuse, §2A3.1, even though the defendant, Michael Phipps, did not commit a sexual assault on the victim. The two defendants declared to a witness that they intended to steal a car from a woman whom they could also kidnap for the purpose of raping her. Phipps forced the victim into the car at gunpoint and restrained her by driving the car while the codefendant, Dean Gilley, forced her to perform sex acts on him and then raped her. Phipps attempted to sexually assault the victim and stopped only because of Gilley’s fear of detection by passing drivers. Thus, Phipps was responsible for the actions of Gilley pursuant to §1B1.3(a)(1).

United States v. Reinhart, 357 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2004), *cert. denied*, 127 S.Ct. 131 (2006). A coconspirator’s sexual exploitation of two minors in videotape did not meet §1B1.3’s reasonable foreseeability requirement where the videotape was created before the defendant entered into the conspiracy to commit sexual exploitation of children.

United States v. Roberts, 203 F.3d 867 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 530 U.S. 1238 (2000). A police officer’s discharge of a firearm constituted relevant conduct for a seven-level enhancement under §2B3.1(b)(2) (discharge of a firearm during a robbery) because the defendant aided his cohort in wrestling the police officer to gain control of the gun, causing the officer to discharge his weapon.

See United States v. Rodriguez, 278 F.3d 486 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 536 U.S. 913 (2002), §2S1.1.

United States v. Rosogie, 21 F.3d 632 (5th Cir. 1994). “[I]nformation from a pending state prosecution on a related offense may be used as relevant conduct.” *Id.* at 634.

United States v. Schorovsky, 202 F.3d 727 (5th Cir. 2000). Conduct of conspirators after a defendant withdraws from a conspiracy is excluded from the defendant’s relevant conduct. The district court erred in including as relevant conduct the quantity of drugs trafficked after defendant effectively withdrew from the conspiracy.

United States v. Wall, 180 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 1999). Incidents in 1996 and 1997 involving seizure of marijuana from defendant’s former girlfriend could not be considered relevant conduct because they were not “part of a common scheme or plan” of the instant 1992 marijuana offense. Two offenses do not constitute a single course of conduct simply because they both involve drug distribution. The “temporal proximity” between the 1996 and 1997

offenses and the instant offense is lacking; the offenses did not involve the same drug supplier or destination; and the modus operandi of the later offenses differs from the instant offense.

§1B1.4 Information to be Used in Imposing Sentence

United States v. Ramirez, 271 F.3d 611 (5th Cir. 2001). “At sentencing, ‘[t]he district court may consider any information which has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.’ This includes findings regarding drug quantities that do not implicate *Apprendi*, testimony of a probation officer and even hearsay.” *Ramirez*, 271 F.3d at 612-13 (citations omitted).

§1B1.8 Use of Certain Information

United States v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 721 (5th Cir. 2001). “At sentencing, information provided under a use immunity agreement may be considered but shall not be used in determining the applicable guideline range except to the extent provided in the agreement. . . . Use of such information is acceptable if the information was ‘known to the government prior to entering into the cooperation agreement. . . .’” *Taylor*, 277 F.3d at 724 n.4. “Generally, a [Presentence Report] bears sufficient indicia of reliability to permit the district court to rely on it at sentencing. ‘The [Presentence Report], however, cannot just include statements, in the hope of converting such statements into reliable evidence, without providing any information for the basis of the statements.’ Normally, the defendant has the burden to show that the information relied on in a [Presentence Report] is inaccurate. The rebuttal evidence presented by the defendant must show that the [Presentence Report’s] information is materially untrue, inaccurate or unreliable. . . . [But] when a use immunity agreement is involved, and the defendant questions the sources of the evidence used against him at sentencing, the burden is on the government to show that the evidence is from outside sources.” *Id.* at 724-26 (citations omitted).

§1B1.11 Use of Guideline Manual in Effect at Sentencing (Policy Statement)

United States v. Diaz-Diaz, 327 F.3d 410 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 540 U.S. 889 (2003). “‘A sentencing court must apply the version of the sentencing guidelines effective at the time of sentencing unless application of that version would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.’ Such a violation occurs when application of a current guideline ‘results in a more onerous penalty’ than would application of a guideline in effect at the time of the offense.” *Diaz-Diaz*, 327 F.3d at 412 (citations omitted).

United States v. Domino, 62 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 1995). “Section 1B1.11 of the Sentencing Guidelines instructs a sentencing court to use the guidelines manual in effect on the date that a defendant is sentenced, unless the court determines that “use of the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced would violate the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution,” in which case the court should use the version of the guidelines in effect on the date that the offense of conviction was committed. ‘A criminal law is ex post facto if it is retrospective and disadvantages the offender by altering substantial personal rights.’ A sentence that is increased pursuant to an amendment to the guidelines effective after the offense was

committed violates the ex post facto clause.” *Domino*, 62 F.3d at 719-20 (citations omitted).

United States v. Ollis, 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005). “Courts are required to ‘use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the offense of conviction was committed.’ The guidelines add, ‘If a defendant is convicted of two offenses, one before and one after the effective date of the revised edition of the guidelines, the revised edition applies to both offenses.’” *Ollis*, 429 F.3d at 544 (citations omitted). “[C]onspiracy ‘is a continuing offense’ and ‘[s]o long as there is evidence that the conspiracy continued after the effective date of the [amendments to the] guidelines, the Ex Post Facto Clause is not violated.’” *Id.* at 545. Moreover, unless a conspirator effectively withdraws from the conspiracy, he is to be sentenced under the amendments to the guidelines, even if he did not commit an act in furtherance of the conspiracy after the date of the new guidelines, or did not know of acts committed by other co-conspirators after the date of the new guidelines, where it was foreseeable that the conspiracy would continue past the effective date of the amendments.” *Id.* at 545 (citations omitted).

CHAPTER TWO: *Offense Conduct*

Part A Offenses Against the Person

§2A1.2 Second Degree Murder

See United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2004), *cert. denied*, 126 S.Ct. 1022 (2006), §2K2.1.

§2A2.2 Aggravated Assault

United States v. Calbat, 266 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2001). The district court did not err in sentencing the defendant under the most analogous guideline, §2A2.2, for an offense of intoxication assault rather than under §2A1.4. Looking to other circuits, the court found that the Eighth Circuit in particular has held that both guidelines, in different cases, were the most analogous to the crime of vehicular battery. *See United States v. Osborne*, 164 F.3d 434, 439 (8th Cir. 1999); *United States v. Allard*, 164 F.3d 1146, 1148 (8th Cir. 1999). Reviewing the issue *de novo*, the court compared “the elements of the defendant’s crime of conviction to the elements of federal offenses already covered by a specific guideline.” *Calbat*, 266 F.3d 358 at 363; *see United States v. Nichols*, 169 F.3d 1255, 1270 (10th Cir. 1999), *cert. denied*, 528 U.S. 934 (1999). The analogous federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 113) states “assault resulting in serious bodily injury” is a general intent crime and thus the *mens rea* requirement would be satisfied by voluntarily consuming alcohol and then operating a motor vehicle when intoxicated. *Calbat*, 266 F.3d at 363. In addition, while §2A1.4 does mention the specific behavior of driving while intoxicated, the element of the death of the victim is not present in this case. Therefore, this federal statute, and the corresponding sentencing guideline, §2A2.2, is most analogous to the state crime of intoxication assault. There was no error by the court in its consideration of the victim’s injuries, nor in enhancing the defendant’s sentence for more than minimal planning on the finding that he attempted to flee the scene of the crime. The court relied on the factual basis that there was more than minimal planning to cover up the offense, not that there was planning

prior to the act. *Id.* at 364.

United States v. Perrien, 274 F.3d 936 (5th Cir. 2001). “More than minimal planning [under §2A2.2] includes, among other things, taking ‘significant affirmative steps ... to conceal the offense.’” In this case, the Fifth Circuit determined the district court did not err in allowing a two-level sentencing enhancement for the defendant based on “more than minimal planning.” *Id.* The defendant was convicted of assault within the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” after he was determined to have abused his two daughters. The Fifth Circuit determined the enhancement was proper because the defendant acknowledged hurting the children, not seeking medical attention, and initially claiming not to know what was wrong with the child. These acts constituted sufficient affirmative actions to conceal his crime.

United States v. Price, 149 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 1998). The district court correctly applied the six-level enhancement for “permanent or life-threatening bodily injury” rather than the four-level enhancement for “serious bodily injury” where damage to the victim’s hand was permanent and had resulted in a 15 to 25 percent loss of function. The court of appeals rejected the defendant’s claim that the six-level enhancement should be reserved for the most serious injuries: the plain language of Application Note 1(h) to §1B1.1 encompasses injuries that may not be terribly severe but are permanent. The enhancement punishes not just the severity of the injury, but its duration.

§2A3.1 Criminal Sexual Abuse; Attempt to Commit Criminal Sexual Abuse

United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2004). “Section 2A3.1(b)(4) provides for a two-level enhancement if ‘the victim sustained serious bodily injury.’ That term is defined in §1B1.1, Application Note 1(I) as ‘injury ... requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation.’ [In this case, the police officer at] the scene of the crime ... determined that [the victim] needed to be taken to the hospital because of his physical condition. [The victim] remained hospitalized overnight with a variety of medical complaints. Further, § 1B1.1 Application Note 1(I) also instructs that ‘serious bodily injury’ is deemed to have occurred if the offense involved conduct constituting criminal sexual abuse under 18 U.S.C. § 2241 or § 2242. [The defendant in this case] was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2242, which is captioned ‘Aggravated sexual abuse.’” *Bell*, 367 F.3d at 470.

“Inconsistently, however, § 2A3.1 Application Note 1, explains that the term ‘serious bodily injury,’ for that section ‘means conduct other than criminal sexual abuse, which already is taken into account in the base offense level.’ It is not clear how this inconsistency is to be worked out. Nonetheless, in the present case there was additional evidence, other than the rape, that [the victim’s] face was swollen as though he had been beaten and this is sufficient for the two-level enhancement for inflicting serious bodily injury. Therefore, the district court did not err in enhancing [the defendant’s] sentence for causing serious bodily injury.” *Id.*

United States v. Hefferon, 314 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2002). “The Criminal Sexual Abuse Guideline, § 2A3.1(b)(5), states, under the Specific Offense Characteristics subsection, that ‘[i]f the victim was abducted, increase by 4 levels.’ The Criminal Sexual Abuse Guideline itself does not define ‘abduction.’ However, the commentary to the Application Instructions defines

‘abducted’ to mean ‘that a victim was forced to accompany an offender to a different location. For example, a bank robber’s forcing a bank teller from the bank into a getaway car would constitute abduction.’” *Hefferon*, 314 F.3d at 224. “[T]he term ‘forced to accompany’ was not meant to preclude adjustments where the force applied was by means of ‘veiled coercion’ rather than brute physical strength, at least in a situation . . . where the victim is easily overcome by veiled coercion. . . . The word ‘forced’ in the term ‘forced to accompany,’ like the term ‘a different location,’ is ‘to be flexible and thus susceptible of multiple interpretations, which are to be applied case by case to the particular facts under scrutiny’” *Id.* at 226. In this case, the court of appeals determined that the enhancement was proper when the defendant tricked a seven-year-old girl into performing oral sex on him and telling her that what occurred was their little secret. The court of appeals stated that the defendant “abducted the victim by appealing to a seven-year-old sense of obedience to adults and [that] because of her inability to make assessments of that kind, [the] [d]efendant was able to abduct her through a means of veiled coercion.” *Id.* at 227. The court of appeals explained that defendant “was able to isolate the victim by dominating her lack of intellectual ability, and also by appealing to the credulous nature of a seven-year-old.” *Id.*

§2A3.4 Abusive Sexual Contact or Attempt to Commit Abusive Sexual Contact

United States v. John, 309 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002). The defendant was convicted of two counts of sexual contact with a minor under the age of twelve, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(1). The Fifth Circuit held that the fact that the victim was under the age of twelve had already been taken into account in the base offense level of §2A3.4(a)(3) and thus an additional enhancement under §2A3.4(b)(1) resulted in double-counting. The court explained that, by process of elimination, there are only two offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(1) insofar as it incorporates section 2241(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(3), that are covered in the base offense level in §2A3.4(a)(3). The background commentary to §2A3.4 exempts section 2244(a)(3) from the age enhancement because age is already an element of the offense. Similarly, in cases involving section 2244(a)(1), age is an element of the offense. Accordingly, the court concluded that the enhancement in §2A3.4(b)(1) should not apply.

Part B Basic Economic Offenses

§2B1.1 Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft; Offenses Involving Stolen Property; Property Damage or Destruction; Fraud and Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the United States

United States v. Austin, 479 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2007). The defendant argued that assets pledged as a result of bankruptcy proceedings “relate back” to when the bankruptcy petitions were filed (prior to the discovery of the instant fraud) and he should receive a credit against loss for those assets. The defendant also argued that once the bankruptcy proceedings were initiated, through no fault of his own, he could not pledge assets to the creditor victims until the bankruptcy reorganization plan was approved subsequent to discovery of the instant fraud. The court rejected this argument stating that “a good faith intent to repay” does not satisfy the credit

against loss rule.

United States v. Geeslin, 447 F.3d 408 (5th Cir. 2006). “Under subsection 2B1.1(b), the amount of loss is a factor in determining the appropriate sentence. The application notes define loss as the greater of the actual loss and the intended loss. Actual loss, the only loss relevant here, is ‘the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.’” *Geeslin*, 447 F.3d at 410.

“The [G]uidelines provide for a credit against loss where the victim of the fraud receives value. The loss amount is reduced by ‘[t]he money returned, and the fair market value of the property returned and the services rendered, by the defendant or other persons acting jointly with the defendant, to the victim before the offense was detected.’ . . . The application notes define a victim as ‘(A) any person who sustained any part of the actual loss determined under subsection (b)(1); or (B) any individual who sustained bodily injury as a result of the offense. ‘Person’ includes individuals, corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies.” *Id.*

In this case, the defendant complained that the district court treated his co-conspirator as a victim in applying §2B1.1. In upholding the enhancement, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the definition of victim includes someone in the co-conspirator’s position. The Fifth Circuit explained that the co-conspirator’s agreement to participate in the defendant’s scheme to defraud a municipality did not preclude the district court’s determination that he was a victim because it was not entirely voluntary. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the defendant was the co-conspirator’s superior and controlled access to the targeted program. The Fifth Circuit stated further that there was little the co-conspirator had to gain “as his participation was already accomplishing the goals of staying in his employer’s good graces and receiving money.” *Id.* at 11.

United States v. Londono, 285 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2002). The district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement under §2B1.1(b)(2) for a theft that was not from the person of another. The defendant served as a lookout for those committing a diamond theft at an airport. Section 2B1.1 permits an enhancement for “theft from the person of another” and defines it as “theft, without the use of force, of property that was being held by another person or was within arms’ reach.” The Fifth Circuit held that the theft to which Londono served as an accomplice did not fulfill this definition. The owner of the stolen property was ten feet away from it at the time it was stolen. There was linear separation and three impediments separating the owner from the property, including an accomplice, a magnetometer, and an x-ray machine. In addition, the guideline requires some sort of physical temporal interaction between the victim and the thief, typically within arms’ reach of one another. Such contact was not involved in Londono’s situation. Finally, §2B1.1 commentary states that the victim must be aware of the theft in order for the enhancement to be applied. Without this awareness, the potential for victim injury, which is the focus of the sentence enhancement, does not exist. Here, the victim did not know he was being robbed. He had lost visual and physical contact with his property while undergoing security procedures at the airport.

United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005). “Although otherwise amended in 2001, the guideline covering securities fraud has continuously provided that a sentencing court

should use the greater of actual or intended loss. The guidelines measure criminal culpability in theft and economic crimes according to their pecuniary impact on victims. Actual loss, which is at issue here, ‘means the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the offense.’ Moreover, actual loss ‘incorporates [a] causation standard that, at a minimum, requires factual causation (often called ‘but for’ causation) and provides a rule for legal causation (*i.e.*, guidance to courts regarding how to draw the line as to what losses should be included and excluded from the loss determination).’” *Id.* at 546 (citations omitted). In calculating loss in a “cook the books” securities fraud case, the sentencing court must consider the “numerous extrinsic market influences as well as the soundness of other business decisions by the company.” *Id.* at 547. This case includes a fairly thorough discussion about how to calculate loss in different types of securities fraud cases.

United States v. Onyiego, 286 F.3d 249 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 537 U.S. 910 (2002). “‘Section 2B1.1(b)(1) increases the base offense level on a graduated scale according to the amount of the victims’ loss.’ . . . ‘Loss’ under this sentencing guideline provision means ‘the value of the property taken, damaged, or destroyed.’ Typically, this value is the ‘fair market value of the particular property at issue.’” *Onyiego*, 286 F.3d at 255 (citations omitted). In this case, the defendant argued that the value written on the stolen blank airline tickets did not reflect the fair market value of the tickets. He maintained that the fair market value was better estimated by the amount he actually received for the stolen tickets. The court of appeals explained that “[t]he black market value of the blank airline tickets—*i.e.*, [the] proceeds from the sale of the tickets—is not the same as the fair market value of those tickets.” *Id.* at 256. The court of appeals reasoned that “[o]ne assumes that the black market price of a stolen good will reflect a discount from the fair market price (*i.e.*, value) of that good” and that “[f]ew, if any, persons knowingly pay the full market price for a stolen good.” *Id.* The court of appeals explained that when the district court has little evidence of the fair market value of the stolen property, the application notes to the guidelines “allow the sentencing court to use other reasonable means to ascertain the level of loss to the victim.” *Id.* In this case, “the district court measured the loss as the amount billed by the airlines to the victim.” *Id.* The court of appeals determined that “[c]alculating losses in this fashion was entirely appropriate.”

§2B3.1 Robbery

United States v. Franks, 230 F.3d 811 (5th Cir. 2000). “Sentencing Guideline § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A-F) provides enhancements for sentencing in a robbery conviction for the use of a firearm, use of a dangerous weapon, or for an express threat of death made by the defendant during the course of a robbery. However, Application Note 2 to § 2K2.4 provides that where a defendant convicted of robbery is also convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) or § 929(a) for the use of a firearm in connection with a robbery and sentenced under the mandatory provisions for those offenses, ‘any specific offense characteristic for the possession, use, or discharge of a firearm (*e.g.* § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A)-(F) (Robbery)), is not to be applied in respect to the guideline for the underlying offense.’ [I]t is clear that under the[se] sentencing guideline provisions. . . , the offense level for robbery may not be enhanced for the use of a firearm if the defendant has also been convicted of using a firearm during that robbery, which carries a mandatory sentence.” *Franks*, 230 F.3d at 813-14. In this case, the court of appeals determined that “an express threat of death may not be used to enhance a defendant’s sentence under §2K2.4 when he is also

convicted of a violation of § 924(c) if the threat of death is related to ‘the possession, use, or discharge’ of the firearm for which he was convicted under § 9249(c).” *Id.* at 814 (citations omitted).

United States v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1998), *vacated on other grounds*, 165 F.3d 1020 (5th Cir. 1999). Section “2B3.1(b)(4) provides [that] ‘(4) (A) If any person was abducted to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape, increase by 4 levels; or (B) if any person was physically restrained to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape, increase by 2 levels.’ ‘Physically restrained’ is defined . . . as ‘the forcible restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked up.’ ‘Abduct’ is defined as ‘a victim was forced to accompany an offender to a different location. For example, a bank robber’s forcing a bank teller from the bank into a getaway car would constitute abduction.’” *Hickman*, 151 F.3d at 460-61. In this appeal, the Fifth Circuit explained that “it is possible for a district court to conclude that a defendant physically restrained his victims without evidence that he actually tied, bound, or locked them up,” *id.* at 461, but that here the defendant only tapped a person on the shoulder with a gun. The court reasoned that although the defendant’s “actions permitted no alternative but compliance, he did nothing to restrain his victim that an armed robber would not normally do.” *Id.* Consequently, an enhancement was not appropriate under the guideline.

United States v. Mitchell, 366 F.3d 376 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 543 U.S. 881 (2004). In this appeal, the Fifth Circuit determined that §2B3.1(b)(3) operates as a strict liability provision. The court stated that the guideline requires an increase if any victim sustained bodily injury. The court explained that the guideline “contains no requirement that the injury be reasonably foreseeable or that the defendant be culpable for the injury beyond committing the base offense.” *Mitchell*, 366 F.3d at 379. In addition, the court stated, §1B1.3(a)(3) “states that determinations are to be based on ‘all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified in subsection (a)(1) and (a)(2).’” *Id.* The court explained that these “guidelines contain no additional culpability requirement.” *Id.* Consequently, the court determined that a defendant is strictly liable for any injury a victim suffers as a result of his acts.

§2B5.3 Criminal Infringement of Copyright or Trademark

United States v. Beydoun, 469 F.3d 102 (5th Cir. 2006). For the purposes of calculating loss in a trafficking in counterfeit goods case the value of goods “made or controlled” is used, not the value of goods actually sold. Even if the defendant never sold a single counterfeit item he remains accountable for infringing items produced with the intent of sale.

United States v. Yi, 460 F.3d 623 (5th Cir. 2006). While a sentencing judge may base the loss figure in a trafficking in counterfeit goods case on the retail value of the infringed (bona fide) item to “provide a more accurate assessment of the pecuniary harm” to the trademark owner, this cannot be done without evidence of the pecuniary harm to the victim companies. The court must base its finding on the facts in the record.

Part C Offenses Involving Public Officials and Violations of Federal Election Campaign Laws

§2C1.1 Offering, Giving, Soliciting, or Receiving a Bribe; Extortion Under Color of Official Right; Fraud Involving the Deprivation of the Intangible Right to Honest Services of Public Officials; Conspiracy to Defraud by Interference with Governmental Functions

United States v. Snell, 152 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 1998). A juror qualifies as a “government official” in a “high-level, decision-making or sensitive position” within the meaning of §2C1.1(b)(2)(B). The defendant pled guilty to a charge of bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(A) for taking a bribe from criminal defendants on whose jury he sat as a foreman. The sentencing court enhanced the defendant’s sentence by eight levels under §2C1.1(b)(2)(A). The Fifth Circuit upheld the enhancement, stating that jurors occupy a central position in the criminal justice system that is at least equivalent to that of the other public service officers, such as judges and prosecutors, explicitly mentioned in the application note.

Part D Offenses Involving Drugs

§2D1.1 Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession with Intent to Commit These Offenses); Attempt or Conspiracy

United States v. Allison, 63 F.3d 350 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 516 U.S. 955 (1995). “If the district court is sentencing the defendant based on the size and capability of the [methamphetamine] laboratory, it is the size and production capacity of the laboratory, not the actual amount of methamphetamine seized, that is the touchstone for sentencing purposes.” *Allison*, 63 F.3d at 353.

United States v. Bustos-Useche, 273 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 535 U.S. 1071 (2002). “The [s]entencing [g]uidelines provide for a two-level increase in a defendant’s offense level for possession of a dangerous weapon. The commentary suggests adjusting the offense level if the weapon was present during the commission of the offense, ‘unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.’ ‘Possession of a firearm will enhance a defendant’s sentence . . . where a temporal and spatial relationship exists between the weapon, the drug-trafficking activity, and the defendant.’” *Bustos-Useche*, 273 F.3d at 628-29 (citations omitted). In this case, the defendant maintained the enhancement was improper because he did not possess the weapon to assist himself in committing the offense and that he never used the weapon or showed it to anyone during the commission of his offense. The court of appeals observed that the defendant had the weapon with him when he boarded a vessel upon which cocaine was loaded, the defendant was responsible for accounting for the cocaine, and the firearm remained in the defendant’s possession until he threw it overboard. The court viewed this evidence as establishing a sufficient connection between the weapon and the offense. The court of appeals stated that it would not reverse the enhancement simply because the defendant did not “display or brandish” the firearm.

United States v. Carbajal, 290 F.3d 277 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 537 U.S. 934 (2002). “Section 2D1.1(a)(2) establishes a base offense level of 38 if the defendant is convicted of drug

trafficking under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) ‘and the offense of conviction establishes that death or serious bodily injury resulted from use of the substance.’” *Carbajal*, 290 F.3d at 282. In this appeal, the Fifth Circuit determined that this provision is “a strict liability provision that applies without regard for common law principles of proximate cause or reasonable foreseeability.” *Id.* at 283. Based on this determination, the court upheld an enhancement based on two overdose deaths that resulted from the use of heroin sold by the defendant’s organization.

United States v. Clark, 389 F.3d 141 (5th Cir. 2004). A district court may properly consider drug amounts intended for personal use when calculating the base offense level for a defendant convicted of participating in a drug conspiracy.

United States v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2001). “[T]he sentencing guidelines provide that the defendant’s sentence should be increased by two levels whenever, in a crime involving the manufacture, import, export, trafficking, or possession of drugs, the defendant possessed a dangerous weapon.” *Cooper*, 274 F.3d at 245. In this case, the Fifth Circuit explained that although firearms are “tools of the trade” in drug conspiracies, the government must still “demonstrate that a temporal and spatial relation existed between the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and the defendant” for the enhancement to apply. *Id.* at 246.

United States v. Leonard, 157 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1998). A drug defendant need not face a mandatory minimum sentence in order to be entitled to a downward sentencing adjustment under §2D1.1(b)(6). The provision, providing for a decrease of two offense levels if the criteria of §5C1.2 (“safety valve”) are met, applies on its face, as a “specific offense characteristic,” regardless of whether or not the defendant is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence.

United States v. McWaine, 290 F.3d 269 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 537 U.S. 921 (2002). The district court did not err in applying §2D1.1(c)(1) to determine the base offense level for a defendant convicted of 21 U.S.C. §841(b)(1)(C) (2001). The defendant asserted that the application of §2D1.1(c)(1) to convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), is to evade *Apprendi*. The defendant argued that Application Note 10 and the background information in §2D1.1 make clear that the different subsections providing base offense levels for differing drug quantities correspond to the different drug quantity levels provided for in section 841 (b)(1)(A)-(C). Therefore, the defendant maintained that the district court had the discretion to determine the base offense level for his conviction within the range allowed by §2D1.1(c)(8)-(14) only. The defendant also claimed that the use of §2D1.1 to determine his base offense level was unconstitutional because that subsection is only applicable when a defendant is convicted under section 841 (b)(1)(A). The court looked to *United States v. Doggett*, 230 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 2000), *cert. denied*, 531 U.S. 1177 (2001), to reject the defendant’s arguments. In *Doggett*, the court held that “if the government seeks enhanced penalties based on the amount of drugs under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) or (B), the quantity must be stated in the indictment and submitted to a jury for a finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” *Id.* at 164-65 (citing *Doggett*). The *Doggett* court further held that *Apprendi* only applies when the defendant is sentenced above the statutory maximum and that *Apprendi* has no effect on the district court’s determination of drug quantity under §2D1.1. Based on *Doggett*, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court did not err in applying §2D1.1 to determine McWaine’s offense level because McWaine was not sentenced to more than the statutory maximum that section 841(b)(1)(C) permits.

United States v. Pardue, 36 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 1994), *cert. denied*, 514 U.S. 1113 (1995). In this appeal, the Fifth Circuit determined that Amendment 488 to §2D1.1(c), which incorporated a new method for calculating the quantity of Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD) to be used in determining a defendant’s offense level and guideline range, operates retroactively. Thus, the defendant could move to reduce his sentence on grounds that he was sentenced to term of imprisonment based on sentencing range that was subsequently been lowered.

United States v. Partida, 385 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2004), *cert. denied*, 544 U.S. 911 (2005). “Section 2D1.1 (b)(1) provides for a two-level enhancement when a defendant possesses a dangerous weapon while possessing or trafficking drugs. The government carries the burden of proving a spacial and temporal nexus between the weapon, the drug activity, and the defendant. This enhancement provision will not apply where the defendant is able to show that it is ‘clearly improbable’ that the weapon was connected with the offense. Instead, for the enhancement to be proper the government must show that ‘the weapon was found in the same location where drugs or drug paraphernalia are stored or where part of the transaction occurred.’ . . . [A] §2D1.1 enhancement is proper when a law enforcement agent possesses a weapon at the time he uses his official position to facilitate a drug offense. . . . [T]his enhancement applie[s] even when the officer does not brandish, display, or have active use of the firearm during the offense.” *Partida*, 385 F.3d at 562 (citations omitted).

§2D2.1 Unlawful Possession; Attempt or Conspiracy

United States v. Dodson, 288 F.3d 153 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 537 U.S. 888 (2002). “One goal of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, of which 21 U.S.C. § 851 is a part, was to make the penalty structure for drug offenses more flexible. Whereas the prior version of the statute made enhancements for prior offenses mandatory, the new statutory scheme gave prosecutors discretion whether to seek enhancements based on prior convictions. Accordingly, the statute established in § 851 the requirement that the government inform defendants of its decision to seek enhancement and the prior convictions to be relied upon in the proposed enhancement. Although the information in the indictment and PSI might serve to inform [the defendant] of the government’s knowledge of his prior conviction, it does not accomplish the main purpose of § 851 which is to inform the defendant that the government intends to seek a sentencing enhancement based on that conviction. [A defendant’s] lack of surprise and admission of his prior conviction cannot overcome the government’s failure to file the information required by § 851.” *Dodson*, 288 F.3d at 159 (citations omitted).

Part F Offenses Involving Fraud and Deceit

§2F1.1 Fraud or Deceit¹

United States v. Brown, 186 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1999). The Fifth Circuit held that an adjustment to restitution does not necessarily affect loss enhancement. The defendant pled guilty

¹Guideline deleted by consolidation with §2B1.1.

to wire fraud which resulted from a fraudulent warranty claim. The district court applied a six-level enhancement because of its determination that the loss was \$75,104.18. After the sentencing was completed, the government advised the court that the restitution to the victim insurance companies and individuals was actually lower and it gave the figure of \$67,938.72. The district court lowered the restitution amount accordingly. The defendant argued that this moved him out of the \$70,000 to \$120,000 range and that he should only have received a five-level enhancement for the loss. The Fifth Circuit rejected that argument because adjustments in a restitution figure do not necessarily translate into corresponding decreases in the loss amount. In this case, the Court determined that the defendant's loss amount still exceeded \$70,000 because there was no adjustment in the amount defendant owed to General Motors.

United States v. Godfrey, 25 F.3d 263 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 965 (1994). "Section 2F1.1(b)(2) allows a two-level increase if the defendant (A) engaged in more than minimal planning or (B) engaged in a scheme to defraud more than one victim." *Godfrey*, 25 F.3d at 264-65. In this appeal, the defendant maintained that the district court "improperly 'double counted' in adjusting his sentence level upward by four levels for being a leader or organizer under . . . § 3B1.1(a) and by two levels for more than minimal planning and for involvement in a scheme to defraud more than one victim under § 2F1.1(b)(2)." *Id.* at 264. The court of appeals explained that the guidelines "do not forbid all double counting. Double counting is impermissible only when the particular guidelines in question forbid it." Because neither § 3B1.1 nor § 2F1.1 forbid double-counting with each other, the court stated that increases under both of those sections are permitted. *Id.*

United States v. Izydore, 167 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1999). A bankruptcy trustee's fees are not to be included in the calculation of the amount of loss from a bankruptcy fraud. Section 2F1.1 defines loss as "the value of the money, property, or services unlawfully taken." Bankruptcy trustees' fees are consequential damages, according to the Fifth Circuit, and the commentary to §2F1.1 makes clear that, as a general rule, consequential losses are not to be included in a loss calculation. Because consequential losses are to be considered in certain circumstances enumerated by the commentary to §2F1.1, the court stated that this evidenced an intent by the Sentencing Commission to omit consequential damages from the general loss definition. In this case, the trustees' fees were incurred after the defendant's criminal conduct was completed and, therefore, should not have been included in the defendant's loss determination.

United States v. Magnuson, 307 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 2002) (*per curiam*), *cert. denied*, 537 U.S. 1178 (2003). "Former . . . §2F1.1(b)(3) has since been repealed and replaced by current . . . §2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(ii)." *Magnuson*, 307 F.3d at 335, n.1. In this case, the defendant contended that a two-level enhancement under §2F1.1(b)(3) for using "mass-marketing" in the commission of his offense was improper because his act of placing a newspaper advertisement is passive, unlike solicitation by telephone, mail, or the Internet. "The sentencing guidelines define mass-marketing as a 'plan, program, promotion, or campaign that is conducted through solicitation by telephone, mail, the Internet, or other means to induce a large number of persons to (A) purchase goods or services; . . . or (C) invest for financial profit.'" *Id.* The Fifth Circuit stated that the "definition of 'mass-marketing' is not limited to the listed mediums—it explicitly

contemplates ‘other means’ of mass-marketing.” *Id.* The court explained that “§ 2F1.1(b)(3) merely requires advertising that reaches a ‘large number of persons.’” *Id.*

United States v. McDermot, 102 F.3d 1379 (5th Cir. 1996). “The language of [former] § 2F1.1(b)(6) [was] mandatory, directing the court to ‘increase by 4 levels’ if the factual predicates of the enhancement are met.” *McDermot*, 102 F.3d at 1383. In this case, the district court did not apply the enhancement because the victim insurance company was insolvent due to the failure of its reinsurer prior to the fraud and prior to the defendant’s involvement in the conspiracy. The district court reasoned that once an institution becomes insolvent, it has no ‘safety’ or ‘soundness’ which may be substantially jeopardized. The court of appeals disagreed and determined that the enhancement applied. The court of appeals explained that “[a] defendant who perpetrates fraud with respect to an already insolvent institution may still ‘substantially reduce benefits to . . . insureds’ or cause the institution to be unable ‘on demand to refund fully any deposit, payment, or investment’ over and above the consequences of the initial insolvency.” *McDermot*, 102 F.3d at 1382-83. The court of appeals stated that “[a]lthough the language ‘as a consequence of the offense’ mandates a causal connection between the fraud and the loss, . . . this language [does not] require that all losses associated with a given institution be directly attributable to fraud.” *Id.* at 1383.

United States v. Miles, 360 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2004). Medicare is not a financial institution under §2F1.1 in the 2001 version of the Guidelines Manual. In this case, the government conceded that under *United States v. Soileau*, Medicare is not a financial institution within the meaning of the relevant guideline. The court observed that the provision at issue in *Soileau* was identical in the 2001 Guidelines.

United States v. Quaye, 57 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 1995). “Application Note 7(b) to [former] § 2F1.1 provide[d] that ‘[i]n fraudulent loan application cases . . . the loss is the actual loss to the victim. . . . However, where the intended loss is greater than the actual loss, the intended loss is to be used.’” *Quaye*, 57 F.3d at 448. Thus, the district court must calculate the “intended” amount of loss in order to apply the guideline.

United States v. Soileau, 309 F.3d 877 (5th Cir. 2002). Medicare is not a financial institution under §2F1.1 in the 2000 version of the Guidelines Manual. “Congress has never defined the term ‘financial institution’ to include the Medicare Program nor directed the Sentencing Commission to do so and it appears the Commission has never exercised its authority in order to include Medicare in the definition of ‘financial institution.’ Therefore, [the defendant’s] sentence cannot be enhanced on the basis of §2F1.1(b)(8)(B)(2000) because Medicare is not a ‘financial institution’ as defined in U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1, comment. (n. 19) (2000).” *Id.* at 881.

Part G Offenses Involving Prostitution, Sexual Exploitation of Minors, and Obscenity

§2G2.2 Trafficking in Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor; Receiving, Transporting, Shipping, or Advertising Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor; Possessing Material Involving the Sexual Exploitation of a Minor with Intent to Traffic; Possessing Material Involving the Sexual

Exploitation of a Minor

United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 535 U.S. 1002 (2002). The district court did not err in applying §2G2.2 as the appropriate sentencing guideline rather than §2G2.4 because the government showed sufficient proof that there was an indication of the defendant's intent to traffic in child pornography. The defendant argued that the district court should have sentenced him under §2G2.4 because he merely possessed child pornography and did not traffic in it as alleged by the government. However, the Fifth Circuit agreed that §2G2.2 was the proper guideline since a cross-reference in §2G2.4 requires use of §2G2.2 if there is an indication of an intent to traffic. *Paul*, 274 F.3d at 159. The district court found that email exchanges between the defendant and another man in which the defendant spoke about posting on pornographic websites and about sending the other man copies of books containing child pornography were sufficient evidence of an intent to traffic in child pornography. The defendant argued that the books he intended to send constituted a gift and that he really did not intend to send the books. The defendant also argued that the government failed to prove that the books themselves actually contained child pornography. The Fifth Circuit found that the defendant's arguments lacked merit because he obtained hundreds of images of child pornography from the Internet and there were significant indications that he posted images on a child pornography website at some point. Because this type of exchange is considered sufficient to constitute trafficking, the Fifth Circuit determined that it was also sufficient to invoke the cross-reference in §2G2.4. Although the defendant correctly asserted that the district court cannot make a determination that the books contained child pornography based on speculation alone, the Fifth Circuit found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence in the form of the descriptions the defendant gave in his e-mails and the names of the books in question, to determine that both contained child pornography.

United States v. Simmonds, 262 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 534 U.S. 1098 (2002). The district court did not err in enhancing the defendant's sentence on the finding that he had "distributed" pictures of child pornography. The defendant argued that pursuant to §2G2.4, "distribution" means something of value was received in exchange for the photographs. The court recently concurred with other circuits in holding "even purely gratuitous dissemination of child pornography is considered 'distribution.'" *Id.* at 472; *see United States v. Hill*, 258 F.3d 355 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 534 U.S. 1033 (2001). The court also noted that the plain meaning of "distribution" means "to dispense or to give out or deliver" and thus, for purposes of the guidelines, includes gratuitous transmissions. *Id.*

§2G2.4 Possession of Materials Depicting a Minor Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct²

United States v. Gonzalez, 445 F.3d 815 (5th Cir. 2006). "The . . . provision, §2G2.4(b)(5), was enacted in the 2003 PROTECT Act, which failed to address, and thus left undisturbed, its predecessor from 1991, §2G2.4(b)(2). . . . We are satisfied that the PROTECT Act, which became effective on April 30, 2003, and includes the new, graduated scale of enhancements inserted as §2G2.4(b)(5) of the [g]uidelines, superseded §2G2.4(b)(2). There is a

²Deleted by consolidation with §2G2.2

distinguishing difference between the routine tweakings of the [g]uidelines scheme by the Sentencing Commission acting on its own and changes expressly wrought by a direct congressional amendment with an effective date set by Congress. And, the Sentencing Commission itself subsequently recognized that the PROTECT Act's insertion of §2G2.4(b)(5) "superceded" §2G2.4(b)(2)." *Gonzalez*, 445 F.3d at 817-18.

See United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 535 U.S. 1002 (2002), §2G2.2.

See United States v. Simmonds, 262 F.3d 468 (5th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 534 U.S. 1098 (2002), §2G2.2.

Part J Offenses Involving the Administration of Justice

§2J1.7 Commission of Offense While on Release

United States v. Dadi, 235 F.3d 945 (5th Cir. 2000), *cert. denied*, 532 U.S. 1072 (2001). The enhancement under this guideline "can only be imposed after sufficient notice has been given to the defendant by either the government or the court. Notice must be given at the time of the defendant's release from custody in order to be deemed sufficient." *Dadi*, 235 F.3d at 955. "[F]ailure by the releasing judge to give the defendant notice of the § 3147 enhancement bars the sentencing judge from applying it later." *Id.*

Part K Offenses Involving Public Safety

§2K1.4 Arson; Property Damage By Use of Explosives

United States v. Smith, 354 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. 2003), *cert. denied*, 541 U.S. 953 (2004). In a case of first impression, the Fifth Circuit, consistent with the Third, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits, determined that a hotel room counts as a "dwelling" within the meaning of §2K1.4(a)(1)(B), regardless of whether it is occupied at the time of the crime.

§2K2.1 Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition; Prohibited Transactions Involving Firearms and Ammunition

United States v. Caldwell, 448 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2006). "The plain language of the guideline dictates that the government need not prove that the firearm was actually used in a specific other felony offense; it is enough that a defendant had reason to believe that it would be. While our circuit has not had occasion to examine this particular language of § 2K2.1(b)(5) in the past, several cases from other circuits support our holding." *Caldwell*, 448 F.3d at 292 (citations omitted). In this case, the Fifth Circuit explained that although no direct evidence conclusively established the defendant's "understanding of the future use of the firearms, the sentencing court is permitted to make common-sense inferences from the circumstantial evidence." *Id.*

United States v. Condren, 18 F.3d 1190 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 856 (1994). The

district court did not err in finding that the defendant used or possessed a firearm “in connection with” another felony offense. Section 2K2.1(b)(5) mandates an enhancement if the defendant “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition *in connection with* another felony offense.” *Id.* at 1196 (emphasis added). The district court correctly found that a firearm located in close proximity to narcotics, fully loaded and readily available to the defendant to protect drug-related activities, was a firearm used in connection with the drug offense.

United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 2004), *cert. denied*, 126 S.Ct. 1022 (2006) (No. 05-321). In the course of a police pursuit of his vehicle, the defendant fired shots and a police officer was killed. The defendant was convicted in federal court of possession of firearms and ammunition while subject to a domestic restraining order. The district court applied the cross reference in §2K2.1(c)(1)(B) and used the guideline for second-degree murder (§2A1.2) when sentencing the defendant. He challenged his sentence on appeal, arguing that the court should have applied the involuntary manslaughter guideline (§2A1.4). The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that by firing his weapon at the police cruiser which the defendant likely knew to be occupied, he displayed the requisite extreme recklessness and disregard for human life that constitutes malice under federal law sufficient for a finding of second-degree murder. The fact that a state jury acquitted the defendant of capital murder does not mean that he did not commit second-degree murder under federal law.

United States v. Houston, 364 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 2004). “Section 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) . . . imposes a two-level enhancement if a firearms-offense ‘involved’ between three and seven firearms. For purposes of calculating the number of firearms ‘involved’ in a given offense, courts are to consider only those firearms unlawfully possessed. Possession may be actual or constructive. ‘Constructive possession’ is ownership, dominion, or control over the item itself, or control over the premises in which the item is concealed. Although a defendant’s exclusive occupancy of a place may establish his dominion and control over an item found there, his joint occupancy of a place cannot, by itself, support the same conclusion. In cases of joint occupancy, like the matter . . . constructive possession [exists] only where there is evidence supporting a plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of, and access to, the item.” *Houston*, 364 F.3d at 248 (citations omitted). In this case, the defendant was arrested in a hotel room. He advised the arresting officer about two firearms in the room. The officers, however, found a third firearm in the purse of the defendant’s wife. The court of appeals determined that no evidence indicated that the defendant had constructive possession of the pistol in the purse. “The gun was not in plain view, [the wife]—not [the defendant]—disclosed the location of the gun, and [the defendant] expressed to the officers his belief that the room contained two, rather than three, firearms.” *Id.* at 249. The “district court’s finding of constructive possession rests solely upon [the defendant’s] statement during a presentence interview that he had ‘the pistol’ for protection because his wife had been previously raped.” *Id.* The court of appeals determined that “without more, [the statement] in no way indicates his knowledge of, and access to, the . . . pistol in [the] purse.” *Id.* As a result, application of the enhancement was improper.

United States v. Jackson, 453 F.3d 302 (5th Cir. 2006). A “felony” for the purposes of §2K2.1(b)(5), providing for a four-level enhancement when a firearm is used in connection with another felony offense, will mean any offense (federal, state, or local) punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year whether or not a conviction was obtained. In *Jackson*, the

defendant argued that his conduct only constituted a misdemeanor under Texas law. However, the sentencing judge determined that the evidence introduced regarding his conduct constituted a felony under Texas law. The court affirmed this ruling as it was adequately supported by the facts on the record regardless of whether the defendant had been formally charged or convicted of any felony offense.

United States v. Kirk, 111 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. 1997). As an issue of first impression, the Fifth Circuit determined that a conviction for the Texas offense of sexual indecency with a child involving sexual contact constituted a crime of violence. The court referred to the definition of “crime of violence” in §4B1.2(a)(2), which states that a crime of violence is an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” The court analogized to an opinion about 18 U.S.C. § 16, indecency with a child involving sexual contact. The reasoning in such cases presumes that adults are larger and stronger than children, and there is always the risk that an adult will use physical force to ensure his victim’s compliance. Whenever there exists a risk of physical force, there exists a risk that physical injury will result. The court explained the threat of violence in such cases is inherent in the size, age and authority position of an adult dealing with a child. The facts of this case were such that the defendant lured his victim, an eight-year-old boy, into a secluded area of a local park using deceit and then sexually molested the boy. The court characterized this conduct as a crime of violence.

United States v. Luna, 165 F.3d 316 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 526 U.S. 1126 (1999). A defendant who is convicted of possession of stolen firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), is not subjected to impermissible double-counting when the sentencing court enhances his offense level under §2K2.1 on the basis of both the fact that he possessed firearms in connection with the burglary in which he stole them, §2K2.1(b)(5), and the fact that the firearms he possessed were stolen, §2K2.1(b)(4). First, the unambiguous language of §2K2.1 and its commentary authorize application of both subsections. Second, there are significant differences between the aims of the two subsections. Finally, even assuming that application of both subsections does amount to double-counting, such double-counting was intended by the guidelines because the Sentencing Commission provided no express exception to the application of both subsections.

United States v. McCowan, 469 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 2006). The defendant argued that there was no evidence that he possessed the firearm and marijuana simultaneously and therefore the enhancement for “unlawful user of a controlled substance” under §2K2.1(a)(6) should not apply. The court noted that “unlawful user” as defined in 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 states “a person may be an unlawful current user of a controlled substance even though the substance is not being used at the precise time the person [...] possesses a firearm.” The court also noted that the evidence in the case showed that the defendant had recently tested positive for use and admitted daily use of the drug and therefore implicitly fell into the category of “unlawful user.”

United States v. Mitchell, 166 F.3d 748 (5th Cir. 1999). The district court erred in applying §2D1.1, the drug guideline, using the cross reference in §2K2.1(c) based on the defendant’s possession of a gun. The record did not show that the defendant possessed the firearm “in connection with the commission or attempted commission” of a drug possession offense. The gun, but no drugs, was recovered from the defendant’s car; the drugs were

recovered from his girlfriend's house in a locked box in the living room; there was no evidence that the car was used to transport drugs; and no evidence of "either spatial or functional proximity of the gun in the car and the drugs in the house." The requirement in §2K2.1(c) that a firearm be possessed in connection with the commission of another offense "mandate[s] a closer relationship between the firearm and the other offense than that required" under §2K2.1(b)(5). *Id.* at 756.

United States v. Riva, 440 F.3d 722 (5th Cir. 2006). Section 2K2.1 "provides for a base offense level of 24 if a defendant has at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence. That section adopts the definition of 'crime of violence' as provided in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 and its commentary." *Riva*, 440 F.3d at 723. "In determining whether a prior conviction is a 'crime of violence' under the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2), th[e] court takes a categorical approach and may only look to the relevant statute and in certain circumstances to the conduct alleged in the charging document. [A] prior conviction is considered a crime of violence under the residual clause 'only if, from the fact of the indictment, the crime charged or the conduct charged presents a serious potential risk of injury to a person. Injury to another need not be a certain result, but it must be clear from the indictment that the crime itself or the conduct specifically charged posed this serious potential risk.' When a statute provides a list of alternative methods of committing an offense, [the court] may look to the charging papers to determine by which method the crime was committed in a particular case." *Id.* at 723-24 (citations omitted). In this appeal, the court of appeals determined that the defendant's prior conviction for "unlawful restraint of a person less than 17 years of age is a crime of violence under the residual clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2) because it 'otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.'" *Id.* at 723.

See United States v. Turner, 305 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2002), §4B1.2, p. 42.

United States v. Villegas, 404 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2005). The enhancement applies only when the defendant's use or possession of the firearm may have facilitated or made more dangerous the other felony offense. In this case, the possession of the firearm did nothing to facilitate the defendant's use of fraudulent documents or make it a more dangerous crime. The defendant purchased a firearm at a gun show, submitting three forms of identification, including a fraudulent resident alien card. He was convicted of being an alien in possession of a firearm and the district court enhanced his sentence under §2K2.1(b)(5), after finding that the defendant possessed the firearm in connection with the use of fraudulent immigration documents. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the defendant did not possess the firearm "in connection with" the use of the fraudulent documents.

United States v. Williams, 365 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2004). The enhancement may be applied without a showing that the defendant knew that the firearm was stolen. Moreover, because the adjustment occurs during sentencing when the court's discretionary authority is broad, the adjustment does not offend due process. Here, the defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm while under indictment for a felony. The sentencing court increased his offense level by two levels under §2K2.1(b)(4) because the firearm was stolen. The defendant challenged the enhancement, asserting that application of the enhancement violated his due process rights because he did not know the gun was stolen. The Fifth Circuit upheld the enhancement.

§2K2.4 Use of Firearms or Armor-Piercing Ammunition or Explosive During or in Relation to Certain Crimes

United States v. Dixon, 273 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 537 U.S. 829 (2002). The district court did not commit “double counting” when applying the weapon enhancement for the robbery offenses because the enhancement was not applied to the underlying offense for the section 924(c) conviction. Looking to Application Note 2 in the guideline, the court held that the prohibited “double counting” only applies to the offense which underlies the gun count. *Id.* at 643.

Part L Offenses Involving Immigration, Naturalization, and Passports

§2L1.1 Smuggling, Transporting, or Harboring an Unlawful Alien

United States v. Cuyler, 298 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2002). Transporting four illegal aliens in the bed of a pickup truck on the highway intentionally or recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to the aliens, justifying an enhancement under §2L1.1, even though state law did not prohibit adults from riding in the bed of a pickup truck. Unrestrained passengers in the bed of a pickup can easily be thrown from the truck and almost certainly would be injured in the event of an accident.

United States v. Garcia-Guerrero, 313 F.3d 892 (5th Cir. 2002). Although the commentary to §2L1.1 includes many examples of reckless conduct involving the transportation of aliens in vehicles, reckless conduct for the purposes of an enhancement under that section includes a wide variety of conduct. In this case, the defendant acted as a guide in leading nine undocumented aliens into the United States. During a two-day trip through the brush, temperatures reached 105 degrees. The aliens had insufficient water and insufficient food, in part, because the defendant failed to accurately advise them about the length of the journey. The aliens requested longer rest periods, but the defendant denied the requests. This conduct demonstrated the dangerous nature of the trip and justified an enhancement under §2L1.1.

United States v. Garcia-Mendez, 420 F.3d 454 (5th Cir. 2005), *cert. denied*, 126 S.Ct. 1398 (2006). A prior Texas conviction for second degree burglary of a habitation qualified as a crime of violence under §2L1.1 because the offense was equivalent to burglary of a dwelling, an enumerated offense under that guideline.

United States v. Rodriguez-Mesa, 443 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 2006) A smuggled alien’s inability to extricate himself from a compartment built in the center console of a minivan may serve as an additional aggravating factor to support an 18-level enhancement under §2L1.1(b)(5) for intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person. In this case, the “compartment was located between the front seats of the vehicle, and there was a door located on top of the compartment. The compartment covered half of [the smuggled alien’s] body, including his head and his torso, but his legs extended on to the floorboard of the front passenger’s side of the vehicle.” *Rodriguez-Mesa*, 443 F.3d at 398. The court of appeals explained that the smuggled alien “could not have easily extricated himself from

a position where ‘his head and upper body were stuffed in the console, and his feet were twisted around underneath the glove compartment.’ That [the smuggled alien] was required to maintain this contorted position on the floor of the minivan (for at least an hour before the checkpoint and potentially for another 250 miles from the checkpoint to Houston), with the upper half of his body stuffed into the console and his arms pinned to his sides, suggests exposure to a ‘substantial risk of . . . serious bodily injury.’ Contrary to [the defendant’s] assertions, . . . photographs indicate[d] that it would have been difficult to extricate [the alien], regardless of whether the lid of the console opened easily, because of [the alien’s] cramped position in the compartment.” *Id.* at 403. Based on this evidence, the court of appeals determined the enhancement was proper. This opinion provides a good analysis/comparison of *United States v. Solis-Garcia*, 420 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2005).

United States v. Solis-Garcia, 420 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2005). The act of transporting four aliens lying in the cargo area of a minivan, with no aggravating factors, does not constitute an inherently dangerous practice such as to create a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to those aliens to support an enhancement under §2L1.1. Unlike passengers who are transported in the bed of a pickup truck, unrestrained passengers in a van are protected by the passenger compartment of the vehicle. In addition, a passenger “riding in the cargo area of a minivan has access to oxygen, is not exposed to extreme heat or cold, and can easily extricate himself from his position on the floor of the van.” *Id.* at 516. “The only dangers . . . associated with riding in the cargo area of the minivan are generally the same dangers that arise from an individual not wearing a seatbelt in a moving vehicle.” *Id.*

United States v. Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 268 (2005). Section 2L1.1 provides for a two-level increase where the offense involved intentionally or recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person. As examples of creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, the application note for §2L1.1 lists transporting persons in the trunk or engine compartment of a motor vehicle, carrying substantially more passengers than the rated capacity of a motor vehicle or vessel, and harboring persons in a crowded, dangerous, or inhumane condition. In this case, the defendant acted as a guide in smuggling 140 undocumented aliens into the United States in a tractor-trailer. The vehicle contained many more passengers than its rated capacity and the trailer was dangerous because of a lack of ventilation. Because this is precisely the conduct addressed by the example, the enhancement was appropriate.

§2L1.2 Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the United States

United States v. Acuna-Cuadros, 385 F.3d 875 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 543 U.S. 1029 (2004). A prior conviction for the Texas crime of retaliation does not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” for purposes of the sixteen-level “crime of violence” enhancement under § 2L1.2. Although the actual conduct described in the indictment alleged the use of physical force against the person of another, those allegations were irrelevant in determining whether physical force was an element of the offense. Instead, the court must look to the applicable statute to determine the elements of the offense.

United States v. Alfaro, 408 F.3d 204 (5th Cir.), *cert denied*, 126 S. Ct. 271 (2005). A

prior conviction for the Virginia offense of shooting into an unoccupied dwelling was not a crime of violence for the purposes of a sixteen-level enhancement under §2L1.2. The Fifth Circuit explained that a sentencing court must look to the elements of a prior offense, not to the facts of the conviction, when classifying a prior offense for enhancement purposes. To determine whether a prior conviction is a crime of violence, “the statute of conviction, not the defendant’s underlying conduct, is the proper focus.” *Id.* at 208. Shooting into an occupied dwelling is not one of the enumerated offenses that qualify as a crime of violence and the Virginia statute does not have, as a necessary element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force against another.

United States v. Caicedo-Cuero, 312 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 2002), *cert. denied*, 538 U.S. 1021 (2003). A prior conviction for the Texas state jail felony of simple possession of marijuana constituted a felony for purposes of an eight-level aggravated felony enhancement under §2L1.2 even though the defendant’s sentence was suspended and the defendant was placed on probation. Although Texas law required the court to suspend the sentence for a first-time offender, the offense was still classified as a state jail felony and the statutory range of punishment for the offense was 180 days to two years of incarceration.

United States v. Calderon-Pena, 383 F.3d 254 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc), *cert. denied*, 543 U.S. 1076 (2005). The 2001 version of the guidelines called for a sixteen-level enhancement under §2L1.2 if the defendant had been convicted of a crime of violence. The commentary to this section defined crime of violence as an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. To determine whether an offense has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, the court must look to the statute of conviction for elements of the offense, not to the defendant’s actual conduct in committing the offense. In this case, the defendant’s prior conviction for the Texas offense of child endangerment did not constitute a crime of violence for the purposes of an sixteen-level enhancement under §2L1.2 because the offense did not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. The statutory elements did not require any bodily contact—violent or otherwise—or any injury. To commit the offense, the statute required only that the defendant knowingly create a danger of bodily injury. The statute did not even require that the child be aware of the danger. As a result, the offense did not qualify for the sixteen-level enhancement.

United States v. Chapa-Garza, 243 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2001). A prior conviction for the Texas offense of felony driving while intoxicated (DWI) is not a crime of violence. “The crime . . . is committed when the defendant, after two prior DWI convictions, begins operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Intentional force against another’s person or property is virtually never employed to commit this offense.” *Id.* at 927.

United States v. Dominguez-Ochoa, 386 F.3d 639 (5th Cir. 2004), *cert. denied*, 543 U.S. 1131 (2005). A prior conviction for the Texas crime of criminally negligent homicide was not equivalent to manslaughter which is an enumerated crime of violence under §2L1.2. Criminally negligent manslaughter did not employ the recklessness *mens rea* necessary for generic manslaughter—criminally negligent homicide was not manslaughter’s equivalent.

United States v. Estrada-Mendoza, 475 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 2007). Prior conviction for drug possession, although a felony under Texas law, could not support an 8-level enhancement under §2L1.2(b)(1)(C) because mere possession of a controlled substance is not a felony under the Federal Controlled Substances Act. The Fifth Circuit opinion in this case was influenced by *Lopez v. Gonzales*, 127 S.Ct. 625 (2006).

United States v. Gracia-Cantu, 302 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2002). The defendant's prior Texas conviction for injury to a child was not a "crime of violence" for the purposes of a 16-level enhancement under §2L1.2. Section 22.04(a) of the Texas Penal Code, the statute criminalizing injury to a child, does not require that the perpetrator actually use, attempt to use, or threaten to use physical force against a child. Moreover, there is no substantial risk that physical force will be used to effectuate the offense because a defendant can be convicted of this crime based upon omissions rather than conscious acts.

United States v. Gutierrez-Ramirez, 405 F.3d 352 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 217 (2005). A sentencing court may not rely exclusively on a shorthand description of a conviction like an abstract of judgment to determine whether a prior conviction for violating § 11352(a) of the California Health & Safety Code was a "drug trafficking offense." The Supreme Court explained in *Shepard v. United States*, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), that a court is generally limited to examining the statutory definition of the offense, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented in determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony. A California abstract of judgment is generated by the court's clerical staff and is not an explicit factual finding by the state trial judge under *Shepard*.

United States v. Hernandez-Neave, 291 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2001). The defendant's prior conviction for the Texas offense of unlawfully carrying a firearm in an establishment licensed to sell alcoholic beverages was not a crime of violence for enhancement purposes under §2L1.2. The Fifth Circuit explained that it does not matter if the defendant's conduct created a risk of violence—what matters is the nature of the crime itself. Rather than requiring physical force, the Texas criminal code required only that the defendant, with intent, knowledge or recklessness, carried a handgun into an establishment which is licensed or permitted to sell alcoholic beverages.

United States v. Izaguirre-Flores, 405 F.3d 270 (5th Cir.), *cert denied*, 126 S. Ct. 217 (2005). A prior conviction for the North Carolina offense of taking indecent liberties with a child constituted "sexual abuse of a minor" for purposes of the "crime of violence" enhancement under §2L1.2. It was not necessary to determine whether the underlying statute of conviction "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another" because "sexual abuse of a minor" was a specifically enumerated offense under §2L1.2. Instead, the court used a common sense approach in determining whether taking indecent liberties with a child constituted "sexual abuse of a minor." Under a common sense approach, "[t]aking indecent liberties with a child to gratify one's sexual desire constitute[d] 'sexual abuse of a minor' because it involves taking undue or unfair advantage of the minor and causing such minor psychological—if not physical—harm." *Id.* at 274-75.

United States v. Landeros-Gonzales, 262 F.3d 424 (5th Cir. 2001). The defendant's prior

conviction for the Texas offense of criminal mischief did not constitute a “crime of violence” or “aggravated felony.” The court recognized that it had previously held “force,” within the definition of “crime of violence,” was “synonymous with destructive or violent force,” but stated that in this instance, graffiti was not the type of destructive force considered in those prior cases. Graffiti posed no substantial risk that the defendant was going to use “destructive or violent force” in the commission of the offense.

United States v. Lopez-Coronado, 364 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2004). The defendant, who pled guilty to illegal reentry after deportation, received a four-level enhancement pursuant to §2L1.2(b)(1)(D) for deportation after a felony conviction. After the defendant was sentenced, the commentary to Note 1(A)(iv) to §2L1.2 was amended to provide that the enhancement in subsection (b)(1) does not apply to a conviction for an offense committed before the defendant was 18 years of age unless such a conviction is classified as an adult conviction under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the defendant was convicted. The amendment was not included in the list of retroactive amendments. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the amendment was substantive and therefore did not apply to the defendant retroactively. The court properly counted the defendant’s juvenile adjudications as felony convictions under the 2002 guidelines.

United States v. Luciano-Rodriguez, 442 F.3d 320 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 127 S.Ct. 747 (2006). In this appeal, the Fifth Circuit determined that the defendant’s conviction for the Texas offense of sexual assault did not constitute a crime of violence under §2L1.2(b)(1)(A) because the offense did not require the use of force as an element. The court explained that Texas Penal Code § 22.011 criminalizes assented-to-but-not-consented-to conduct and that the element of force is absent from the applicable subsection of the statute. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in applying the 16-level enhancement under 2L1.2.

United States v. Martinez-Paramo, 380 F.3d 799 (5th Cir. 2004), *cert. denied*, 544 U.S. 934 (2005). The defendant pled guilty to unlawfully remaining in the United States after a previous deportation. The district court imposed a 16-level “crime of violence” enhancement pursuant to §2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) for defendant’s prior Pennsylvania conviction for making terroristic threats. The Fifth Circuit remanded, stating the record was insufficient to make the determination. The Pennsylvania statute contains three subsections, one which arguably qualifies as a crime of violence and two which arguably do not. Fifth Circuit precedent permits a court to look beyond the fact of conviction to determine the elements of the statute to which defendant pled guilty. Here, however, the record was devoid of an information or indictment charging the defendant with the elements of the terroristic threats offense.

United States v. Meraz-Enriquez, 442 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 2006). In this appeal, the Fifth Circuit determined that the defendant’s conviction for the Kansas offense of attempted aggravated sexual battery did not constitute a crime of violence under §2L1.2 because the offense did not require the use of force as an element. The court explained that the applicable Kansas statute—Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3518—provides for some methods of committing the offense that do not require the use of force. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in applying the 16-level enhancement under §2L1.2.

United States v. Murillo-Lopez, 444 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 2006). “The application notes to

section 2L1.2 state that an offense is a ‘crime of violence’ if (1) it has the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another as an element of the offense, or (2) it qualifies as one of several specifically enumerated offenses. . . . In determining whether a prior offense is equivalent to an enumerated offense that is not defined in the Guidelines, like ‘burglary of a dwelling,’ we have said that ‘we must define [the enumerated offense] according to its ‘generic, contemporary meaning’ and should rely on a uniform definition, regardless of the ‘labels employed by the various States’ criminal codes.’ We have also said that we must apply a ‘common sense approach’ in determining whether a prior conviction constitutes an enumerated offense as that offense’ is understood in its ‘ordinary, contemporary, [and] common’ meaning.’ If the statute of conviction is overly broad, we may also examine certain adjudicative records to determine whether the prior conviction qualifies as an enumerated offense. ‘These records are generally limited to the ‘charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of the plea colloquy, and any explicit factual findings by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.’” *Murillo-Lopez*, 444 F.3d at 339-40 (citations omitted). “Applying a common sense approach and the ordinary, contemporary and common meaning of the word ‘dwelling,’ we conclude that *Taylor*’s definition of generic burglary, although instructive, does not strictly apply to the specific offense ‘burglary of a dwelling’ as used in the [g]uidelines. Instead, ‘burglary of a dwelling’ includes the elements of generic burglary as stated in *Taylor* but it also includes, at a minimum, tents or vessels used for human habitation.” *Id.* at 344-45. The court of appeals determined in this case that the district court could consider the defendant’s California burglary conviction as described in the criminal complaint as equivalent to “burglary of a dwelling” and thus could apply §2L1.2’s enhancement for a “crime of violence.”

United States v. Rivera, 265 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 534 U.S. 1146 (2002). The defendant’s prior state conviction of cocaine possession was an “aggravated felony” under the guideline. The court noted that as a matter of statutory construction, the defendant’s argument was foreclosed by its decision in *United States v. Hinojosa-Lopez*, 130 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 1997). The defendant attempted to raise a “constitutional rule-of-lenity” argument; however, the court held that inasmuch as this is a statutory construction argument, it is foreclosed by *Hinojosa-Lopez*.

United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 388 F.3d 466 (5th Cir. 2004). The defendant’s prior convictions for burglary of a building and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle were not crimes of violence. Neither offense was listed in Note 1(B)(ii)(II) to §2L1.2 as a crime of violence, nor did they require proof of force in order to convict. Accordingly, the district court erred in applying the 16-level crime of violence enhancement.

United States v. Sanchez-Villalobos, 412 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2005), *cert. denied*, 126 S.Ct. 1142 (2006). A prior Colorado state misdemeanor conviction for possession of codeine constituted an aggravated felony justifying an eight-level enhancement under §2L1.2. The offense was punishable under the Controlled Substances Act and the offense would be a felony under either state or federal law. Although the conviction constituted a misdemeanor under state law, the defendant would have been subject to up to two years imprisonment if convicted under federal law. Because federal law equates the term felony with offenses punishable by more than one year imprisonment, the state misdemeanor conviction would have been a felony under federal law.

United States v. Torres-Diaz, 438 F.3d 529 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 126 S.Ct. 1487 (2006). Ordinarily, the sentencing court must look only to the statute of conviction to determine whether a prior conviction constitutes a crime of violence under §2L1.2. The Fifth Circuit previously stated that whenever a statute lists different methods of committing an offense, the sentencing court may look to the charging papers to see which of the various statutory alternatives were involved in the particular case. In this case, the Fifth Circuit explained that the government can meet its burden to show which one of the various alternatives was involved if the charging document filed in the prior case unambiguously identifies the one particular subdivision charged and nothing in the record casts doubt on, or creates ambiguity respecting, that conclusion. The Fifth Circuit also explained that it uses a common sense approach to determine whether a prior conviction constitutes an aggravated assault, and thus a crime of violence, under §2L1.2. The court then compared the meaning of assault in the Model Penal Code with the Connecticut statute—under which the defendant was convicted—for assault in the second degree. Because the court found that the Connecticut statute for assault in the second degree almost exactly tracked the Model Penal Code definition of aggravated assault, it concluded that the defendant’s conviction was a crime of violence.

United States v. Trejo-Galvan, 304 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2002). The defendant’s three prior misdemeanor convictions for driving under the influence were not “crimes against the person” that triggered the enhanced penalty provision under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Because the statute did not define “crimes against the person,” the Fifth Circuit considered the common law definition and determined that a “crime against the person” is an “offense that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that the offender will intentionally employ physical force against another person.” Driving under the influence is not a crime against the person because it does not involve a substantial risk that the offender will intentionally use force against another person.

United States v. Urias-Escobar, 281 F.3d 165 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 536 U.S. 913 (2002). A prior conviction for a “misdemeanor” can be used as an aggravated felony under §2L1.2 if it involves term of imprisonment of at least one year.

United States v. Valdez-Valdez, 143 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1998). A Texas deferred adjudication may be considered as a conviction for a felony under §2L1.2.

United States v. Valenzuela, 389 F.3d 1305 (5th Cir. 2004). Under the applicable state statutes, convictions for the Florida offenses of DUI/bodily injury and DUI/manslaughter did not require the intentional use of force, and thus, prior convictions for those offenses did not justify an sixteen-level enhancement under §2L1.2 for having been previously convicted of a crime of violence.

United States v. Vargas-Duran, 356 F.3d 598 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 541 U.S. 965 (2004). A prior conviction for the Texas offense of intoxication assault was not a crime of violence for enhancement purposes under §2L1.2. The use of force under §2L1.2 requires that a defendant intentionally avail himself of that force. “[T]he intentional use of force must be an element of the predicate offense if the predicate offense is to enhance a defendant’s sentence.” *Id.* at 599. The Texas offense of intoxication assault was not a crime of violence because it does not have the intentional use of force as an element of the crime.

Part P Offenses Involving Prisons and Correctional Facilities

§2P1.1 Escape, Instigating or Assisting Escape

United States v. Mendiola, 42 F.3d 259 (5th Cir. 1994). The circuit court ruled that §2P1.1 does not violate equal protection even though it treats persons convicted of driving while intoxicated in Texas, where the offense is punishable by two years in jail, more harshly than persons convicted for the same offense in states where the maximum penalty is less than one year. The defendant pled guilty to escaping from federal custody, but was ineligible for the offense level reduction provided in §2P1.1(b)(3) because the drunk driving offense for which he was convicted while on escaped status was punishable by a term of one year or more under state law. The defendant acknowledged that the guideline was subject only to rational basis review, and that there was a legitimate governmental purpose for denying offense level reductions to defendants who commit crimes after escaping from federal custody. He argued, however, that the criteria for denying the reduction—focusing on the maximum penalty allowed, rather than the penalty received—was not a rational means for accomplishing this goal. The circuit court disagreed, concluding that the guideline’s focus on maximum possible penalty was rational because it reflected the localized determinations of the seriousness of offenses, and such determinations play a significant role in imposing a sentence for escape from federal custody.

Part S Money Laundering and Monetary Transaction Reporting

§2S1.1 Laundering of Monetary Instruments; Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property Derived from Unlawful Activity

United States v. Charon, 442 F.3d 881 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 127 S.Ct. 260 (2006). In this appeal, the Fifth Circuit determined that it was proper for the district court to consider conduct relevant to the defendant’s drug-dealing conduct in calculating the defendant’s base offense for his money laundering offense. The appellant maintained that the district court erred by calculating his base offense level for money laundering based on conduct that was related to his drug-dealing conduct rather than based only on the drugs that were directly related to his money laundering offense. The appellant argued that §2S1.1(a)(1) “does not direct the court to apply relevant conduct; instead, the guideline limits the offense level determination to the underlying offense from which the laundered funds were derived.” *Charon*, 442 F.3d 886. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument. The court of appeals explained that “relevant conduct is inherent in the grouping rules under § 3D1.2(d).” The court of appeals reasoned that “analysis under §3D1.2(d) necessarily takes into account the “relevant conduct; provisions of the [g]uidelines, and §2S1.1(a)(1) does not require the court to do anything differently under that section.” *Id.* at 888.

The defendant in this case also maintained that the district court erred by imposing a two-level enhancement for sophisticated money laundering under §2S1.1(b)(3). The court of appeals rejected this argument, explaining that “[§]2S1.1(b)(3) provides that if the offense involved ‘sophisticated laundering,’ the offense level may be increased by two levels. The commentary to this section defines ‘sophisticated laundering’ in part as ‘complex or intricate offense conduct’

that typically involves the use of, inter alia, ‘two or more levels (*i.e.*, layering) of transactions, transportation, transfers, or transmissions, involving criminally derived funds that were intended to appear legitimate.’” *Id.* at 890. The court further explained that “[w]hen an individual attempts to launder money through ‘two or more levels of transactions,’ the commentary clearly subjects an individual to the sophisticated laundering enhancement.” *Id.* at 892. Here, the defendant gave a third party \$20,000 in cash from his drug proceeds, had the third party obtain a cashier’s check in the third party’s name, and then used that check as a down payment on a piece of property. The Fifth Circuit upheld these actions as a sophisticated scheme to conceal or disguise the defendant’s cocaine trafficking proceeds and impede the discovery of his offense.

United States v. McIntosh, 280 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2002). Amendment 634 which lowered the base offense levels for money laundering convictions was a clarifying amendment, not a substantive amendment. As a result, the amendment is not applied retroactively.

United States v. Rodriguez, 278 F.3d 486 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 536 U.S. 913 (2002). “[U]nless a defendant is convicted under the money laundering statute, money laundering cannot be used against him as relevant conduct to enhance his sentence. However, monies relating to a conviction under the money laundering statute may be considered, and a greater amount of money than is charged in the indictment or proven beyond a reasonable doubt could be considered if it relates to the conviction. In order for the greater amount of money to be considered, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the money was laundered.” *Id.* at 493.

Part X Other Offenses

§2X1.1 Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy (Not Covered by a Specific Offense Guideline)

United States v. Cabrera, 288 F.3d 163 (5th Cir. 2002). “Section 2X1.1(a) directs the sentencing court to use the base offense level from the guideline for the substantive offense and to apply ‘any adjustments from [that] guideline for any intended offense conduct that can be established with reasonable certainty.’” *Id.* at 170. The reasonable-certainty standard applies only to conduct that was allegedly intended to occur, not to conduct that allegedly did occur.

United States v. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 534 U.S. 1095 (2002). The district court did not err in increasing the defendant’s offense level based on factual findings that he was a leader/organizer of the conspiracy. The court held that the record contained ample evidence of his aggravating role, such as the defendant introducing others into the conspiracy.

§2X5.1 Other Offenses

See United States v. Calbat, 266 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2001), §2A2.2, p. 5.

CHAPTER THREE: *Adjustments*

Part A Victim-Related Adjustments

§3A1.1 Hate Crime Motivation or Vulnerable Victim

United States v. Angeles-Mendoza, 407 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 2005). In this case, the Fifth Circuit explained that a victim must be unusually vulnerable for the enhancement under §3A1.1 to apply. Here, the evidence established that the aliens were physically restrained until payment for their transport was received. The Fifth Circuit determined that the holding of aliens pending payment was not an unusual practice and the record did not establish that the illegal aliens smuggled by the defendants were more unusually vulnerable to being held captive than any other smuggled alien. The court reversed application of the vulnerable victim enhancement and remanded for resentencing.

United States v. Brugman, 364 F.3d 613 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 543 U.S. 868 (2004). “For the two-level enhancement under §3A1.1(b)(1) to apply, the victim must be ‘unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or . . . otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.’” *Brugman* 364 F.3d at 621. In this case, the defendant, a Border Patrol agent, was convicted of depriving an illegal alien of his constitutional rights while acting under color of law. The victim had been apprehended by other agents, was sitting on the ground when he was kicked by the defendant. The defendant also assaulted a second alien. The Fifth Circuit affirmed a §3A1.1(b)(1) vulnerable victim increase based on fact that victim alien was immobile, sitting on the ground, and under the supervision of another Border Patrol agent when defendant took advantage of this susceptibility and assaulted him.

United States v. Dock, 426 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2005), *cert. denied*, 126 S.Ct. 1160 (2006). Section 3A1.1 provides for an enhancement if the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim. The application note defines a vulnerable victim as “a person who is unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or who is otherwise susceptible to the criminal conduct.” U.S.S.G. §3A1.1, cmt. n.2 (2004). In this case, the Fifth Circuit upheld the enhancement where the defendant helped smuggle fifty undocumented aliens from Mexico by transporting them in a tractor-trailer—many in a two-to-three foot crawl space. During the trip, temperatures inside the trailer reached an estimated 150 degrees. The court explained that a person’s illegal status alone does not make a person a vulnerable victim, but here the aliens faced desperate circumstances—they were held in isolation in cramped quarters in New Mexico for almost two weeks waiting for transport; once the smugglers locked them in the truck, they were susceptible to criminal conduct for twelve hours; and they were desperate because they were so far from the border.

United States v. Garza, 429 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2005), *cert. denied*, 126 S.Ct. 1444 (2006). “[S]usceptibility to the defendant’s scheme alone is not enough to qualify victims as unusually vulnerable. The victims must also be ‘vulnerable . . . members of society’ and ‘fall in the same category’ as ‘the elderly, the young, or the sick.’” *Id.* at 173-74 (citations omitted). In this case, the court determined that the victims of the defendant’s mail fraud scheme—undocumented aliens—were unusually vulnerable because of their poverty, language problems, and fears of deportation.

United States v. Lambright, 320 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 2003). “The sentencing guidelines provide for a two-level increase in the base offense level ‘[i]f the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim.’ For the enhancement under § 3A1.1(b)(1) to apply, the victim must be ‘unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or . . . otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.’” *Lambright*, 320 F.3d at 518 (citations omitted). In this case, the defendant-prison-guard assaulted an inmate and maintained on appeal that the district court erred in finding that the inmate was a vulnerable victim. The Fifth Circuit disagreed and explained that the enhancement was appropriate because the inmate “was completely dependent upon the care of the correction officers, . . . was locked in his cell prior to the assault, and . . . could not protect himself from the assault.” *Id.*

§3A1.2 Official Victim

United States v. Gillyard, 261 F.3d 506 (5th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 535 U.S. 1094 (2002). Section 3A1.2 calls for a three-level enhancement where the victim was a government officer or employee. In this case, the court upheld the enhancement where the evidence showed that the defendant endangered police officers during a high-speed chase by making threatening moves with his car towards police vehicles and almost striking a patrol car.

United States v. Ortiz-Granados, 12 F.3d 39 (5th Cir. 1994). Note 5, rather than note 1, governs the application of § 3A1.2(b). Note 5 explicitly applies to subsection (b); it was added to the guidelines at the same time as subsection (b). But note 1 was part of § 3A1.2 before subsection (b) was added and was not amended when subsection (b) was added.

Part B Role in the Offense

§3B1.1 Aggravating Role

United States v. Bringier, 405 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2005), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 264 (2005). Section 3B1.1 calls for a two-level enhancement where the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity involving less than five participants. In this case, the court found sufficient evidence to show that the defendant was a leader or organizer in a drug scheme. The evidence showed that the defendant bought and sold over \$12 million worth of cocaine, used a courier to transport hundreds of thousands of dollars and approximately 100 kilograms of cocaine, hired cooks to convert cocaine into crack, and paid for a house to use for cooking cocaine. The court also found sufficient evidence to show that the defendant was a leader or organizer in a money laundering scheme. The evidence showed that the defendant recruited someone to purchase property for him, paid that person to purchase the property, and continued to exercise control over the person by using him as an intermediary with respect to the property. The evidence also showed that the defendant recruited someone to purchase a car in his name for the defendant’s use, and directed the person with regard to the purchase.

United States v. Boutte, 13 F.3d 855 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 815 (1994). Individuals involved in a criminal activity other than the defendant need not be charged or convicted with the defendant in order to count as participants under §3B1.1; instead, they need

only to have participated knowingly in some part of the criminal enterprise.

United States v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2001). “Proof that the defendant supervised only one other culpable participant is sufficient to make the defendant eligible for the enhancement under [§3B1.1]. There can also be more than one person who qualifies as a leader or organizer of a criminal association or conspiracy.” *Id.* at 247 (citations omitted).

United States v. Turner, 319 F.3d 716 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 538 U.S. 1017 (2003). A sentence enhancement under §3B1.1(c) is appropriate when the evidence shows the defendant directed another in his drug trafficking activities.

§3B1.2 Mitigating Role

United States v. Atanda, 60 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 1995). “[W]hen a sentence is based on an activity in which a defendant was actually involved, § 3B1.2 does not require a reduction in the base offense level even though the defendant’s activity in a larger conspiracy may have been minor or minimal.” *Id.* at 199.

United States v. Partida, 385 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2004), *cert. denied*, 125 S. Ct. 1616 (2005). Section 3B1.2(a) calls for a four-level reduction if the defendant was a minimal participant in a multi-participant criminal activity. In this case, the Fifth Circuit determined that a defendant’s assistance in transporting 300 pounds of marijuana by driving a marked patrol car as an escort vehicle was not a minimal contribution to a larger criminal enterprise which trafficked 600 pounds of marijuana. It did not matter that the defendant did not devise the drug trafficking scheme.

§3B1.3 Abuse of Position of Trust or Use of Special Skill

United States v. Buck, 324 F.3d 786 (5th Cir. 2003). The guidelines provide that an adjustment may not be applied under §3B1.3 if an abuse of trust or skill is included in the base offense level or specific offense characteristic. The defendant argued that the enhancement did not apply to her fraud conviction because fraud inherently includes an abuse of trust. The court determined that the enhancement applies to a fraud sentence “where the defendant employed discretionary authority given by her position in a manner that facilitated or concealed the fraud.” *Id.* at 793. The court explained that “whether a defendant occupied a position of trust must be assessed from the perspective of the victim.” *Id.* at 794. The court determined that the enhancement applied in this case because the defendant was in a unique position, in terms of discretion and ability, to conceal her false reports from the government.

United States v. Deville, 278 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2002). The enhancement applied where the evidence showed that the defendant, while acting as police chief, participated in transporting marijuana for a friend and failed to take action against his friend’s illegal drug trafficking.

United States v. Iloani, 143 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 1998). An enhancement under §3B1.3 is appropriate for a physician who acts in concert with his patients to conduct a fraudulent billing

scheme on the basis of the physician's relationship with an insurance company. The physician abuses his position of trust with an insurance company by fraudulently billing the company for medical care.

United States v. Partida, 385 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2004), *cert. denied*, 125 S. Ct. 1616 (2005). Section 3B1.3 calls for a two-level enhancement if the defendant abused a position of public or private trust. In this case, the Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant's argument that the enhancement constituted double-counting with the guideline for his substantive offense, §2C1.1 (extortion under the color of official right). The court explained that the upward adjustment was applied to the defendant's drug offense—§2D1.1—not to the base offense for his extortion offense. Because the base offense levels under §2D1.1 do not account for a position of trust, the court upheld the enhancement under §3B1.3.

United States v. Sidhu, 130 F.3d 644 (5th Cir.1997). An enhancement under §3B1.3 is appropriate for a doctor who abuses the trust of his patients.

Part C Obstruction

§3C1.1 Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice

United States v. Ahmed, 324 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 2003). The guidelines call for a two-level enhancement under §3C1.1 if the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the offense of conviction. A defendant willfully obstructs or impede, or attempt to obstruct or impede, an investigation if he makes material statements to law enforcement officers that significantly impede the investigation. In this appeal, the court found no evidence that the defendant's statements caused the law enforcement agents "to go on a 'wild goose chase,' or in any other way misled the agents in the sort of manner that has traditionally been the basis for enhancement." *Id.* at 373.

United States v. Clayton, 172 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 1999). A defendant's conduct that violates a federal obstruction-of-justice statute supports the application of an enhancement under §3C1.1 only when the conduct occurs during an investigation of the defendant's instant offense, not when the conduct occurs before an investigation begins.

United States v. Greer, 158 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 1998), *cert. denied*, 525 U.S. 1185 (1999). A defendant who unsuccessfully feigns incompetence in order to delay or avoid trial and punishment qualifies for an offense level enhancement for obstruction of justice. So long as the obstruction is willful, the enhancement may apply to defendants with psychological problems or personality disorders.

United States v. Searcy, 316 F.3d 550 (5th Cir. 2002), *cert. denied*, 538 U.S. 1024 (2003). A "threat not directly communicated to the intended target may serve as the basis for a §3C1.1 enhancement." *Id.* at 551. "[N]othing in the text of the guideline or commentary . . . restricts application of §3C1.1 only to situations in which the defendant directly threatens a witness or communicates the threat to a third party with the likelihood that it will in turn be communicated

to the witness.” *Id.* at 553.

§3C1.2 Reckless Endangerment During Flight

United States v. Southerland, 405 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2005). Section 3C1.2 provides for a two-level enhancement if the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer. Because §1B1.3(a)(1) specifically requires the connection of the enhancement not only to commission, preparation, or evasion, but also to the specific offense of conviction, the court determined that a nexus must exist between the underlying offense and the reckless endangerment during flight for an enhancement under §3C1.2 to apply. The court explained that “[t]he government need not demonstrate that the underlying offense caused either the reckless endangerment during flight or the flight itself, only that a sufficient nexus lie between the underlying offense and the reckless flight.” *Id.* at 268.

United States v. Gillyard, 261 F.3d 506 (5th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 534 U.S. 1094 (2002). “Section 3C1.2 requires a two-level increase ‘[i]f the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.’ Application note 1 to section 3C1.2 instructs that this enhancement should not be applied ‘where the offense guideline in Chapter Two, or another adjustment in Chapter Three, results in an equivalent or greater increase in offense level solely on the basis of the same conduct.’” *Gillyard*, 261 F.3d at 510 (citations omitted).

In this case, the Fifth Circuit upheld the enhancement where the defendant’s “high-speed chase endangered both police officers and others.” *Id.* The Fifth Circuit explained that the defendant “‘travelled through a one lane construction zone to move around other vehicles, struck another vehicle, drove onto the median causing construction workers to jump out of the way for their safety and continued driving erratically across the Louisiana state line.’ In addition, [the defendant’s reckless driving in residential neighborhoods and disregard of stop signs and traffic lights endangered others. [The defendant] also “made threatening moves with his car towards the police vehicles and almost struck a . . . Sheriff’s car.” *Id.* (citations omitted).

Part D Multiple Counts

§3D1.2 Groups of Closely Related Counts

United States v. Davidson, 283 F.3d 681 (5th Cir. 2002). The court determined that guidelines amendment 615 which added text to §3D1.2 may not be retroactively applied because the amendment substantively changed the guideline and the commentary does not classify the amendment as a clarifying amendment.

United States v. Rice, 185 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 1999). A defendant’s convictions of drug trafficking offenses should be grouped, under §3D1.2, with his convictions of laundering the proceeds of the drug trafficking. Here, the defendant’s money laundering sentence was enhanced under §2S1.1(b) on the basis of his knowledge that the money he was laundering was the

proceeds of drug trafficking. Accordingly, the defendant's money laundering and drug trafficking counts should have been grouped under §3D1.2(c) which provides that counts should be grouped when one count embodies conduct that is treated as a specific offense characteristic, or other adjustment to, the guideline applicable to another of the counts. In so holding, the court distinguished *United States v. Gallo*, 927 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1991), which held that money laundering convictions were not to be grouped with convictions for underlying offenses, because *Gallo* did not address subsection (c) of §3D1.2 and instead relied on *United States v. Haltom*, 113 F.3d 43 (5th Cir. 1997), which concerned a defendant who was convicted of fraud and of failing to report the proceeds from the fraud on his income taxes.

United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 537 U.S. 888 (2002). Section 3D1.2 provides that counts of conviction must be grouped "when one of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline applicable to another of the counts." Here, the district court erred in grouping three of the defendant's four counts of conviction. The Fifth Circuit stated that the district court incorrectly considered count one, sexual exploitation of a child, by itself, while grouping the three remaining counts, receipt, distribution, and possession of child pornography, together. The defendant received a five-level enhancement for "engaging in a pattern of activity involving . . . sexual exploitation of a minor" for the group of offenses, thus double-counting the defendant's exploitation offense. The Fifth Circuit stated that the "double counting" increased Runyan's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

United States v. Salter, 241 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2001). Under §3D1.2, the sentencing judge must group all counts involving substantially the same harm together into a single group. Grouping of money laundering counts with drug trafficking counts is appropriate where the defendant knew that the laundered funds were the proceeds of an unlawful activity involving the distribution of drugs.

§3D1.3 Offense Level Applicable to Each Group of Closely Related Counts

United States v. Martinez, 263 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2001). "Under § 3D1.3(a) . . . , when counts are grouped together, the applicable offense level is the highest offense level of the counts in the group." *Id.* at 437.

Part E Acceptance of Responsibility

§3E1.1 Acceptance of Responsibility

United States v. Partida, 385 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2004), *cert. denied*, 125 S. Ct. 1616 (2005). "[A] defendant is not automatically precluded from receiving a reduction for acceptance of responsibility if he exercises his right to trial." *Id.* at 563. Here, the court explained that a defendant may demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility even though he proceeds to trial if he does so to assert and preserve issues unrelated to factual guilt. In this case, the defendants asserted that they went to trial to preserve the legal issue of entrapment. The court determined the defendants were not entitled to an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility because the

entrapment defense challenges criminal intent and thus culpability.

United States v. Brenes, 250 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2001). “A defendant cannot accept responsibility within the meaning of the sentencing guidelines if his acceptance is the product of repeated warnings by the judge at the sentencing hearing.” *Id.* at 293.

United States v. Chung, 261 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit explained that an obstruction-of-justice enhancement usually means the defendant has not accepted responsibility, but that a defendant’s sentence may be enhanced for obstruction of justice and adjusted for acceptance of responsibility in an extraordinary case. The court takes a broad view of the circumstances to determine whether a case is extraordinary.

United States v. Leal-Mendoza, 281 F.3d 473 (5th Cir. 2002). “[A] sentencing judge’s reluctance in awarding the two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility under . . . §3E1.1(a) [has no] bearing on the independent inquiry of whether to award another level reduction under . . . §3E1.1(b).” *Id.* at 476.

United States v. Outlaw, 319 F.3d 701 (5th Cir. 2003). “[A] district court lacks discretion to deny the additional one-level reduction under subsection (b) if the defendant is found to have accepted responsibility under subsection (a), the offense level prior to this two-level reduction is sixteen or greater, and the defendant has complied with the conditions specified in either subsection (b)(1) or subsection (b)(2).” *Id.* at 706. “[A]lthough subsection (b) is part of the ‘acceptance of responsibility’ guideline, the measure of a defendant’s acceptance of guilt or contrition is generally irrelevant to the subsection (b) inquiry. Rather, while the key inquiry for purposes of subsection (a) is whether the defendant has truly demonstrated contrition, once the district court finds the defendant evinces adequate acceptance of his guilt, the inquiry under subsection (b) focuses instead on the functional issues of timeliness and efficiency, with timeliness being ‘at the very heart of the third element, assisting authorities.’” *Id.*

United States v. Pierce, 237 F.3d 693 (5th Cir. 2001). “In determining acceptance of responsibility, . . . the sentencing judge is not limited to the narrowest set of facts constituting the offense, but may consider Defendant’s statements regarding ‘relevant conduct’ as well.” *Id.* at 695.

United States v. Tello, 9 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1993). “[T]he timeliness required for the defendant to be entitled to the extra 1-level decrease [under §3E1.1(b)(2)] applies specifically to the governmental efficiency to be realized in two-but only two-discrete areas: 1) the prosecution’s not having to prepare for trial, and 2) the court’s ability to manage its own calendar and docket, without taking the defendant’s trial into consideration.” *Id.* at 1125-26. “[T]he timeliness of step (b)(2) does not implicate: time efficiency for any other governmental function, including without limitation the length of time required for the probation office to conduct its presentence investigation, and the ‘point in time’ at which the defendant is turned over to the Bureau of Prisons to begin serving his sentence.” *Id.* at 1126.

CHAPTER FOUR: *Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood*

Part A Criminal History

§4A1.1 Criminal History Category

United States v. Arnold, 213 F.3d 894 (5th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a sentence of less than 13 months occurred during the ten-year period prior to the commencement of the offense of conviction, the court should look to the date on which the previous court announced the sentence and not to the date on which the defendant began serving his sentence. In this case, the defendant was convicted of a federal offense committed in February 1999. He had received a term of two years' probation and a suspended sentence of 90 days. His probation was revoked in September 1989, at which time he began serving the suspended sentence. Under §4A1.2(e)(1), subsection (2), a sentence under 13 months counts as a prior sentence if it was imposed "within ten years of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense." *Id.* at 895.

United States v. Brooks, 166 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1999). In the Fifth Circuit, physical confinement distinguishes a "sentence of imprisonment" from other types of sentences. In this case, the defendant argued that his boot camp time should not be considered as a term of imprisonment under §4A1.1. The court of appeals disagreed, explaining that the time in boot camp counted as a sentence of imprisonment because the defendant was not free to leave the boot camp.

United States v. Corro-Balbuena, 187 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 1999). "A two point enhancement under §4A1.1(d) may . . . be applied to increase a § 1326 [illegal reentry] defendant's criminal history score when the district court finds . . . that the defendant was under a criminal justice sentence at any time during the pendency of the continuing § 1326 offense." *Id.* at 485. "Each or any of [a defendant's] multiple surreptitious and illegal reentries may be used, either as part of the instant offense or as relevant conduct, to support the . . . application of §4A1.1(d)." *Id.* at 486.

United States v. DeSantiago-Gonzalez, 207 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2000). Driving while intoxicated constitutes a crime of violence under the "otherwise" clause in §4B1.2. The "very nature of the crime of DWI presents a 'serious risk of physical injury' to others." *Id.* at 264. (Citing *United States v. Rutherford*, 54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 1995)). In this case the defendant was convicted of unlawful reentry and the defendant's three misdemeanor DWI convictions warranted a four-level increase under §2L1.2.

United States v. Henry, 288 F.3d 657 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 537 U.S. 902 (2002). Section 4A1.1 permits a sentencing court to add two criminal history points in its calculation "for each prior sentence of imprisonment" of at least 60 days and not exceeding one year and one month. The rule defines "prior sentence" as "any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt" if the sentence is "for conduct not part of the instant offense." Here, the district court erroneously included two points in the defendant's criminal history calculation for a prior sentence that was imposed upon an adjudication of guilt for conduct that was part of the offense of conviction. The defendant's federal conviction for possession of a firearm while under a restraining order and state conviction for criminal trespass had resulted from the same conduct.

United States v. Holland, 26 F.3d 26 (5th Cir. 1994). “Under §4A1.2(d)(2)(B), the district court may look to any sentence—juvenile or adult—that was imposed within five years of that date.” *Id.* at 28.

United States v. Mota-Aguirre, 186 F.3d 596 (5th Cir. 1999). In this appeal, the court determined that a defendant’s conditional pardon acts as the functional equivalent of parole for the purposes of calculating his criminal history score under §4A1.1. The court reasoned that Texas law generally classifies parole as a conditional pardon and parole qualifies under § 4A1.1(d) as a criminal justice sentence.

United States v. Robinson, 187 F.3d 516 (5th Cir. 1999). A defendant’s prior offenses are part of a common scheme or plan for the purposes of §4A1.1 if they were jointly planned or if it would have been evident that the commission of one would entail the commission of the other.

United States v. Ruiz, 180 F.3d 675 (5th Cir. 1999). The defendant’s conviction for the knowing escape from federal prison camp constituted a “crime of violence” for purposes of career offender guideline.

§4A1.2 Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History

United States v. Ashburn, 38 F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 1994), *cert. denied*, 514 U.S. 1113 (1995). Although the defendant’s Youth Corrections Act conviction was “set aside,” it is not an “expunged” conviction under §4A1.2(j), and is counted in calculating the defendant’s criminal history category. The Fifth Circuit joined the First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits in concluding that Congress did not intend to allow “expungement of the actual records of a [Youth Corrections Act] conviction,” and stated that to do otherwise would allow a “person convicted under its auspices to rewrite his life when his handwriting shows that post-conviction activities are criminal in nature.” *Ashburn*, 20 F.3d at 1343; *but see United States v. Doe*, 980 F.2d 876, 879-82 (3d Cir. 1992).

United States v. Cade, 279 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2002). “[T]he definition of the term ‘prior sentence’ in §4A1.2 controls the meaning of the term in §4A1.3: ‘prior sentence’ does not include relevant conduct.”

United States v. Lamm, 392 F.3d 130 (5th Cir. 2004). The defendant’s prior petty theft conviction was not sufficiently similar to the insufficient funds check offense listed in §4A1.2 to exclude it from the defendant’s criminal history. The offenses are meaningfully different because petty theft poses a risk of physical confrontation, placing others at risk. This risk is heightened if the offender is apprehended during the attempted theft. There is much less risk of physical confrontation for theft by check, just as there is much less risk for insufficient funds check. Moreover, in an insufficient funds check offense not involving use of a false name or non-existent account, the identity and account information of the person issuing the check is known, whereas the perpetrator of petty theft is more difficult to apprehend.

United States v. Salter, 241 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2001). “[O]ffenses are part of a common scheme or plan where ‘commission of one crime entailed the commission of the other,’ *i.e.*, the second offense could not have occurred but for the first offense.” *Id.* at 396. In this case, the

defendant complained that the district court failed to treat his prior conviction for tax evasion and his prior federal conviction for drug trafficking as related cases under §4A1.2(a)(2). The court of appeals determined that the offenses should have been considered part of a common scheme or plan because the defendant would not have had the money that he failed to report on his income tax return if not for the drug trafficking.

§4A1.3 Departures Based on Inadequacies of Criminal History Category (Policy Statement)

United States v. Ashburn, 38 F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 1994), *cert. denied*, 514 U.S. 1113 (1995). In this appeal, the Fifth Circuit determined that a sentencing court may consider conduct that formed the basis for counts of an indictment dismissed under a plea agreement in departing upward from the guidelines. The court reasoned that neither §4A1.3 nor its commentary “suggests that an exception exists for prior similar criminal conduct that is the subject of dismissed counts of an indictment.” The court explained “no statute, guidelines section, or decision of th[e] court . . . preclude[s] the district court’s consideration of dismissed counts of an indictment in departing upward.”

United States v. Cade, 279 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2002). “Relevant conduct is part of the instant offense . . . and therefore is not a ‘prior sentence’ under §4A1.3(a).” *Id.* at 272. “[W]hen a district court determines that a sentence is relevant conduct to the instant offense, and considers it as a factor in adjusting the offense level, such sentence cannot then be considered as a basis for a criminal history category departure under §4A1.3(a).” *Id.* at 271.

United States v. Jones, 444 F.3d 430 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 126 S.Ct. 2958 (2006). “The Guidelines expressly provide in a policy statement that ‘[a] prior arrest record itself shall not be considered for purposes of an upward departure. . . .’ While the [g]uidelines contemplate that a district court may base an upward departure on ‘[p]rior similar adult criminal conduct not resulting in a criminal conviction,’ they also contemplate that there must be ‘reliable information’ of such conduct. Arrests, standing alone, do not constitute reliable information under either the [g]uidelines or our precedent pre-dating the [g]uidelines.” *Jones*, 444 F.3d at 434 (citations omitted). As a result, the district court in this case erred when it considered the defendant’s prior arrests without finding that the defendant was actually convicted in deciding to impose the maximum sentence.

Part B Career Offenders and Criminal Livelihood

§4B1.1 Career Offender

United States v. Deville, 278 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2002). “U.S.S.G §4B1.1 provides enhanced punishment for any ‘career offender,’ which includes criminals with at least two prior felony convictions for either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. Under U.S.S.G §4A1.2(a)(2), prior sentences imposed in ‘related cases’ are to be considered as one sentence when calculating a defendant’s criminal history score. The Commentary to this section instructs that a sentencing court should consider previous cases to be related if they occurred on a

single occasion, were part of a single scheme, or ‘were consolidated for trial or sentencing.’ The Commentary adds that ‘[p]rior sentences are not considered related if they were for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest (*i.e.*, the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to committing the second offense).’” *Deville*, 278 F.3d at 509 (citations omitted). In this case, the defendant contended that the prior convictions that served as the basis for the enhancement should have been considered related because his distribution conviction in one district involved his conspiracy-to-distribute conviction in another district. The Fifth Circuit disagreed, explaining that the defendant’s “two prior convictions occurred in different districts and involved separate drug distributions on different days involving different cooperating individuals.” *Id.*

§4B1.2 Definitions of Terms Used in Section 4B1.1

United States v. Deville, 278 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2002). Under § 4B1.2, “a sentencing court should consider previous cases to be related if they occurred on a single occasion, were part of a single scheme, or ‘were consolidated for trial or sentencing.’” *Id.* at 509.

United States v. Golding, 332 F.3d 838 (5th Cir. 2003). The offense of unlawfully possessing a machine gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) is a “crime of violence” because it constitutes conduct that presents a serious risk of physical injury to another. With respect to the defendant’s argument that “possession” is not “conduct,” the court stated that this contention is foreclosed by its decision in *United States v. Serna*, 309 F.3d 859 (5th Cir. 2002), *cert. denied*, 537 U.S. 1221 (2003), in which it recognized that possession, though often passive, constitutes conduct.

United States v. Houston, 364 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 2004). “[A] crime is a crime of violence under §4B1.2(a)(2) only if, from the face of the indictment, the crime charged or the conduct charged presents a serious potential risk of [physical] injury to a person.” *Id.* at 246 (quoting *United States v. Charles*, 301 F.3d 309, 314 (5th Cir. 2002)). “If an indictment is silent as to the offender’s actual conduct, [the court] must proceed under the assumption that his conduct constituted the least culpable act satisfying the count of conviction.” *Id.* In this appeal, the court determined that neither the indictment charging the defendant with statutory rape nor the nature of the offense showed that the rape victim was 14 years old. As a result, the court concluded that the sentencing court erred in setting the defendant’s base offense level at 20 on the grounds that the prior conviction for statutory rape constituted a crime of violence under §4B1.2(a). The court explained that the least culpable conduct satisfying the count of conviction—consensual sexual intercourse between a 20 year old male and a female a day under 17—did not present a serious potential risk of physical injury.

United States v. Stapleton, 440 F.3d 700 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 126 S.Ct. 2913 (2006). In this opinion, the court of appeals determined that although the Louisiana crime of false imprisonment with a dangerous weapon is not a violent felony under the Force Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, it is a violent felony under the Otherwise Clause. The court explained that “[a] crime does not meet the requirements of the Force Clause if it can be committed without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. The basic offense of false imprisonment in Louisiana does not necessarily involve the use, attempted use or threatened use of force by the offender in every case. That crime requires only that the offender

intentionally confine or detain the victim without consent or legal authority. Thus, the non-consensual confinement of a person through deception or trickery may constitute false imprisonment even when the offender does not use, attempt to use or threaten to use force. Therefore, it follows that, because a loaded pistol is construed in Louisiana to be a dangerous weapon even when totally concealed on the culprit's person during the offense, the crime of false imprisonment with a dangerous weapon likewise can be committed with a hidden loaded pistol, without the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force.” 440 F.3d at 703 (citations omitted).

The court explained the Otherwise Clause requires a different analysis. “The Otherwise Clause is triggered by conduct creating a serious potential risk of physical harm to another, and we believe that such a risk is inherent in the commission of false imprisonment with a dangerous weapon under either prong of ‘dangerous weapon’ recognized by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Gould and Robinson. When an offender commits the crime with a loaded pistol concealed on his person, there is a heightened likelihood of his very effective use of lethal force in response to resistance, interference, frustration, or fear of apprehension. When an offender commits the offense using another type of instrumentality in a manner calculated to or likely to produce death or great bodily harm, there is a heightened likelihood of violence in the interaction between the offender and the non-consensually confined or detained victim or others put in fear of fatal or grievous consequences. In either situation the magnitude of the potential harm and the heightened likelihood of its occurrence combine to create the type of danger contemplated by the Otherwise Clause.” *Id.* at 704 (footnotes and citations omitted).

United States v. Turner, 349 F.3d 833 (5th Cir. 2003). Where the defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser included offense, and was not reindicted on that lesser count, the indictment for the charged offense is not applicable to the analysis of whether the conviction was a conviction of a crime of violence. Where no relevant indictment exists, the court will examine the elements of the lesser included offense of which the defendant was convicted under the second prong of §4B1.2(a)(2). When the court examined the elements of burglary of a building, it determined that the elements of the offense were not sufficient to present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another as required by §4B1.2(a)(2).

United States v. Turner, 305 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2002). In this appeal, the court explained that a two-prong analysis applies to determining whether a prior conviction constituted a crime of violence under §4B1.2—first, whether the elements of the offense include the use of physical force; and second, whether the offense is in the enumerated list of crimes, involves explosives, or meets the “otherwise” part of the definition of crime of violence. Because the defendant’s prior conviction for burglary of a building did not involve explosives or was not an enumerated offense, the court had to determine whether the offense “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” The charging document, however, was not part of the record to make this determination so the court remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the conduct set out in the charging document presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.

United States v. Valenzuela-Quevedo, 407 F.3d 728 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 126 S.Ct. 267 (2005). The court of appeals looks “only to the face of the indictment in deciding whether a

crime presents a serious potential risk of injury to a person.” *Id.* at 732. “Where the defendant’s actual conduct is not clear from the face of the charging document, [the court] proceed[s] ‘under the assumption that his conduct constituted the least culpable act satisfying the count of conviction.’” *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Houston*, 364 F.3d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 2004)). In this appeal, the charging document set out two ways of committing the offense of conviction—*i.e.*, discharging a firearm from a vehicle. The court determined that under the least culpable means—“with intent to intimidate or harass another, did discharge a dangerous weapon or firearm from an automobile or other vehicle, from, upon, or across a highway, in the direction of any vehicle”—the defendant’s conduct posed a serious potential of risk of physical injury to another. The court concluded that the offense constituted a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2), explaining that “[f]iring a weapon from, on, or across a highway at another is a dangerous activity, especially when the motivation for the act is a desire to intimidate or harass.” *Id.*

CHAPTER FIVE: *Determining the Sentence*

Part C Imprisonment

§5C1.1 Imposition of a Term of Imprisonment

United States v. Garcia-Ortiz, 310 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 2002). The Fifth Circuit explained that the permissive wording in §5C1.1(d) gives the district court “virtually complete discretion to impose a split sentence” In fact, the district court’s exercise of this discretion is not reviewable unless the district court believed it did not have the discretion, under the guidelines, to award a split sentence based upon the defendant’s status as an illegal alien. Because the transcript in this case was ambiguous as to whether the district court was exercising its discretion, the appellate court remanded to permit the district court to reconsider its sentence.

§5C1.2 Limitation on Applicability of Statutory Minimum Sentences in Certain Cases

United States v. Flanagan, 80 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 1996). “The defendant has the burden of ensuring that he has provided all the information and evidence regarding the offense to the Government.” *Id.* at 146-47. According to the court, the defendant has the burden of providing this information regardless of whether the government requests such information. *See also United States v. Ivester*, 75 F.3d 182 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 518 U.S. 1011 (1996) (holding that the burden is on the defendant to demonstrate that he has supplied the government with truthful information regarding the offenses at issue).

United States v. Lopez, 264 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 2001). The language of §5C1.2 specifically allows for a safety valve reduction “*without regard to any statutory minimum sentence*” if the requirements of the guideline are met. *Id.* at 529 (emphasis added); §5C1.2. Hence, the district court erred in believing it did not have authority to depart downward below the statutory minimum after granting a reduction under the safety valve guideline. The court of appeals referred to comment (n.9) of the safety valve guideline and explained that the defendant’s entire sentence is exempt from the statutory minimum, “not just that the application of the two-level reduction is exempt from the statutory minimum.” *Id.* at 531.

United States v. McCrimmon, 443 F.3d 454 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 126 S.Ct. 1931 (2006). “[The defendant] has the burden of showing that he is entitled to the safety-valve adjustment. [In this case, the] government’s narcotic agent testified at the resentencing hearing that [the defendant] was evasive during an interview, regarding [the defendant’s] own offense. The agent questioned [the defendant’s] candor during the proffer session because he gave answers inconsistent with corroborated information provided by his codefendants concerning his own drug-trafficking. Moreover, [the defendant] ended the interview when asked about certain people involved in distributing the cocaine. Consequently, the district court found both that [the defendant] had not been truthful regarding his own role in the offense and that he had not provided all of the information within his knowledge about the offense. The district court noted that the premature termination of the proffer session was particularly compelling.” *McCrimmon*, 443 F.3d at 457-58. The court of appeals determined that “district court’s finding that [the defendant] had been less than truthful [was] not clearly erroneous. The agent’s testimony was sufficient to support the district court’s independent determination that [the defendant] was not entitled to the safety-valve adjustment. The [court of appeals determined that the] district court did not err in refusing a safety-valve adjustment.” *Id.* at 458.

United States v. Phillips, 382 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2004). A defendant convicted of an offense under 21 U.S.C. § 860 (distribution or manufacturing in or near schools and colleges) is not eligible for safety valve treatment under §3553(f).

United States v. Rodriguez, 60 F.3d 193 (5th Cir.). “[T]he probation officer is, for purposes of § 5C1.2, not the Government. The purpose of the safety valve provision was to allow less culpable defendants who fully assisted the Government to avoid the application of the statutory mandatory minimum sentences. A defendant’s statements to a probation officer do not assist the Government.” *Id.* at 196 (citations omitted).

United States v. Stewart, 93 F.3d 189 (5th Cir. 1996). Section 5C1.2(5)’s requirement to provide truthful information is not unconstitutional on the grounds that it subjects the defendant to cruel and unusual punishment or involuntary servitude. “The fact that a more lenient sentence is imposed on a defendant who gives authorities all of the information possessed by the defendant does not compel that defendant to risk his or his family’s lives nor does it compel a defendant to work for the Government.”

United States v. Wilson, 105 F.3d 219 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 522 U.S. 847 (1997). “[I]n determining a defendant’s eligibility for the safety valve, §5C1.2(2) allows for consideration of only the defendant’s conduct, not the conduct of his co-conspirators.” *Id.* at 222. “The commentary to §5C1.2(2) provides that ‘[c]onsistent with [U.S.S.G.] §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct),’ the use of the term ‘defendant’ in §5C1.2(2) ‘limits the accountability of the defendant to his own conduct and conduct that he aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused. This language mirrors §1B1.3(a)(1)(A). Of import is the fact that this language omits the text of §1B1.3(a)(1)(B) which provides that ‘relevant conduct’ encompasses acts and omissions undertaken in a ‘jointly undertaken criminal activity,’ *e.g.* a conspiracy.” *Id.* (citations omitted).

Part D Supervised Release

§5D1.1 Imposition of a Term of Supervised Release

United States v. Moreci, 283 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2002). Section 3583(b)(2) of title 18 limits a term of supervised release for class C felonies to “not more than three years.” In this case, the sentencing court orally sentenced the defendant to five years of supervised release, but the written judgment provided for three years of supervised release. “When there is a conflict between a written sentence and an oral pronouncement, the oral pronouncement controls. If, however, there is merely an ambiguity between the two, the entire record must be reviewed to determine the intent of the court. The difference in the term of supervised release reflected here is a conflict, not an ambiguity.” *Id.* at 300 (citations omitted). Because the defendant faced five years of supervision for a Class C felony, the court of appeals modified the defendant’s supervised release to the statutorily mandated three-year term.

§5D1.2 Term of Supervised Release

United States v. Gonzalez, 445 F.3d 815 (5th Cir. 2006) “For purposes of the recommended upward departure under U.S.S.G. §5D1.2, a ‘sex offense’ is ‘an offense, perpetrated against a minor. . . . [In this case, the defendant contended] that mere consumption—as opposed to production—of child pornography does not qualify because it is not an offense perpetrated directly against a minor. [The Fifth Circuit recognized] no such fine distinction. In fact, [the Fifth Circuit explained that it had] previously rejected the argument that the consumption of child pornography is only an indirect offense, observing that ‘there is no sense in distinguishing . . . between the producers and the consumers of child pornography. Neither could exist without the other. The consumers of child pornography therefore victimize the children . . . by enabling and supporting the continued production of child pornography, which entails continuous direct abuse and victimization of child subjects.’ [The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that the defendant’s] possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A [was] a ‘sex offense’ within the meaning of U.S.S.G. §5D1.2, qualifying him for upward departure.” *Gonzalez*, 445 F.3d at 818-19.

§5D1.3 Conditions of Supervised Release

United States v. Cothran, 302 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2002). “The district court has the discretion to impose conditions ‘reasonably related’ to ‘the history and characteristics of the defendant’ or his general rehabilitation.” *Id.* at 290. In this appeal, the defendant complained about two conditions of supervised release: (1) he was prohibited from gambling or visiting gambling establishments, and (2) he had to be treated for substance abuse if directed by the probation office. As for the first condition, the court of appeals explained that “[a] district court does not abuse its discretion . . . by restricting a criminal defendant with a history of excessive gambling from visiting casinos or gambling during supervised release.” As for the second condition, the court explained that a district court “can require participation in a substance abuse program if it has reason to believe that the defendant abuses controlled substances.” *Id.* Here, the defendant had been previously convicted for possession of marihuana and later charged with possession of suspected crack cocaine. Although the latter charge was dismissed and the defendant denied drug use, the court concluded that the district court had a reasonable basis to give the probation department the authority to order the defendant into drug treatment.

United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2001), *cert. denied*, 535 U.S. 1002 (2002). “A district court has wide discretion in imposing terms and conditions of supervised release. However, this discretion is limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), which provides that a court may impose special conditions of supervised release only when the conditions meet certain criteria. First, special conditions of supervised release must be reasonably related to the factors set forth in § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D). These factors include: (1) ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,’ (2) the need ‘to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,’ (3) the need ‘to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,’ and (4) the need ‘to provide the defendant with needed [training], medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.’ In addition, supervised release conditions cannot involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve the latter three statutory goals.” *Id.* at 164-65 (citations omitted). In this case, the defendant pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing child pornography and was sentenced under §2G2.2 because the district court found sufficient basis to conclude that the defendant intended to traffic in child pornography. He challenged his conditions of supervised release on broadness and vagueness grounds. The court of appeals upheld the following conditions: (1) avoid direct and indirect contact with minors; (2) do not engage in any paid occupation or volunteer service which exposes the defendant either directly or indirectly to minors; (3) avoid places, establishments, and areas frequented by minors; (4) do not possess or access computers, the Internet, photographic equipment, audio/video equipment, or any item capable of producing a visual image; and (5) do not use photographic equipment and audio/video equipment.

United States v. Quaye, 57 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 1995). Section 3583(d) of Title 18 authorizes sentencing courts to order that a defendant be surrendered to immigration officials for deportation proceedings as a condition of supervised release but not to order the defendant’s deportation. The circuit court noted that the language of the statute authorizes district courts to “provide,” not “order,” that an alien be deported and remain outside the United States. The fact that Congress used the verb “order” elsewhere in the statute implies that the choice of the verb “provide” was intentional in this situation. Further, the circuit court recognized Congress’s tradition of granting the Executive Branch sole power to institute deportation proceedings. The circuit court noted its unwillingness to conclude that Congress intended to change this tradition through silence. The circuit court held that the district court exceeded its statutory power under section 3583(d) in ordering that the defendant be deported as a condition of supervised release.

United States v. Warden, 291 F.3d 363 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 537 U.S. 935 (2002). “[A]ny conflict between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written sentence must be resolved in favor of the oral pronouncement.” *Id.* at 365. In this case, the defendant complained that the district court erred by imposing new conditions in its written judgment that were not discussed at the sentencing hearing, specifically his responsibility to pay for the costs of drug treatment and counseling, sex offender counseling, and anger management counseling. The court of appeals explained that the difference between the oral pronouncement and the judgment created an ambiguity at most. The court then looked to the intent of the district court and determined that the requirement for the defendant to bear the costs of the ordered treatments was consistent with the district court’s intent that the defendant attend drug treatment, sex offender, and anger management counseling. The court of appeals upheld the judgment because the requirement to pay costs was consistent with the district court’s intent in imposing the conditions.

Part E Restitution, Fines, Assessments, Forfeitures

§5E1.1 Restitution

United States v. Calbat, 266 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2001). “Under the Victim and Witness Protection Act, restitution may be ordered to victims of an offense. An order of restitution must be limited to the loss stemming from the specific conduct supporting the conviction. Section 3664(j)(2) provides that ‘[a]ny amount paid to a victim under an order of restitution shall be reduced by any amount later recovered as compensatory damages for the same loss by the victim’ in any state or federal civil proceeding.

The availability of such an offset depends upon the payment made in the settlement, whether the claims settled involved the same acts of the defendant as those underlying his criminal conviction, and whether the payment satisfies the penal purposes the court sought to impose. It is the defendant’s burden to establish an offset to a restitution order.” *Id.* at 365 (citations omitted). Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, the district court must consider the financial resources of the defendant in determining the restitution payment schedule.

United States v. Onyiego, 286 F.3d 249 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 537 U.S. 910 (2002). Section 3663A of title 18 provides for the mandatory award of restitution in certain cases. “This section limits the restitution award to either (1) the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or destruction or (2) the value of the property on the date of the sentencing less the value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of the property that is returned.” Here, the defendant complained that the district court ordered him to pay the legal fees his victim incurred defending collection actions that resulted from the defendant’s actions. The defendant argued that the legal fees are not recoverable because they were not directly and proximately incurred as a result of the crime. The court of appeals analogized to the language of the section of the code that deals with the discretionary award of restitution. The court explained that it had previously interpreted the discretionary statute to preclude the award of consequential damages and determined that recovery losses cannot be included in a discretionary restitution award. The court applied the same reasoning to the victim’s legal fees in this case and determined that a mandatory restitution order cannot include those costs under section 3663A.

§5E1.2 Fines for Individual Defendants

United States v. Hodges, 110 F.3d 250 (5th Cir. 1997). A defendant may rely on the PSR to establish his inability to pay a fine. “[W]hen a sentencing court adopts a PSR which recites facts showing limited or no ability to pay a fine the government must come forward with evidence showing that a defendant can in fact pay a fine before one can be imposed.” *Id.* (quoting *United States v. Fair*, 979 F.2d 1037, 1041 (5th Cir. 1992)). In this case, the defendant contended that the imposition of a \$10,000 fine was erroneous because he was insolvent. The court of appeals agreed, observing that the PSR showed only a limited ability to pay a fine, if not a total inability to pay, and the government did not present evidence that showed the defendant could pay the fine.

§5E1.4 Forfeiture

United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 522 U.S. 960 (1997). “[M]erely pooling tainted and untainted funds in an account does not, without more, render that account subject to forfeiture.” *Id.* at 1134. But if the government demonstrates that the defendant pooled illegitimate funds to disguise the nature of those funds, the forfeiture of commingled funds—whether legitimate or illegitimate—is appropriate.

Part G Implementing the Total Sentence of Imprisonment

§5G1.2 Sentencing on Multiple Counts of Conviction

United States v. Martinez, 274 F.3d 897 (5th Cir. 2001). “Section 5G1.2(d) instructs a court to impose consecutive sentences as an enhancement only if the sentence derived from a single count cannot achieve the ‘total punishment.’ The decision to impose consecutive sentences up to the level of ‘total punishment’ would be an enhancement. Imposing consecutive sentences above the level of ‘total punishment’ would be an upward departure.” *Id.* at 903. In this case, the court explained that the ‘total punishment’ calculation excludes departures.

§5G1.3 Imposition of Sentence on Defendant Subject to an Undischarged Term of Imprisonment

United States v. Hernandez, 64 F.3d 179 (5th Cir. 1995). “Subsection (a) [of §5G1.3] applies if the defendant commits the instant offense while serving an undischarged term of imprisonment or after sentencing, but before serving the sentence, and subsection (b) applies if the conduct resulting in the undischarged term of imprisonment is taken into account in determining the offense level for the instant offense.” *Id.* at 182. If neither (a) nor (b) applies, the district court must apply subsection (c). That subsection “provides that, in any case other than those covered under subsections (a) and (b), ‘the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to the extent necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental punishment for the instant offense.’” *Id.* In this opinion, the court explained that subsection (c) “is binding on district courts because it completes and informs the application of a particular guideline.” *Id.*

United States v. Londono, 285 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2002). “Application Note 3 to §5G1.3 requires the court to consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3584. Section 3584 directs the court to consider the factors detailed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which lists seven categories of concern, together with accompanying subcategories, that a district court must take into account when imposing a sentence.” *Id.* at 356. In this opinion, the court explained that the sentencing court must, at the time of sentencing, state in open court its reasons for imposing the sentence.

Part H Specific Offender Characteristics

5H1.4 Physical Condition, Including Drug or Alcohol Dependence or Abuse; Gambling Addition (Policy Statement)

United States v. Castillo, 430 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2005). “[A] defendant’s HIV-positive status alone does not constitute an extraordinary medical condition warranting a downward

departure under § 5H1.4.” *Id.* at 241.

§5H1.5 Employment Record (Policy Statement)

United States v. Ardoin, 19 F.3d 177 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 933 (1994). Section “5H1.5 specifically reject[s] . . . employment record as grounds for departure.” *Id.* at 181-82.

§5H1.10 Race, Sex, National Origin, Creed, Religion and Socio-Economic Status (Policy Statement)

United States v. Stout, 32 F.3d 901 (5th Cir. 1994). Guideline 5H1.10 provides that socioeconomic status is not relevant in the determination of a sentence. In this case, the sentencing judge departed upward, in part, because of the defendant’s socioeconomic status—*i.e.*, his excessive lifestyle. Although the sentencing judge erred in considering the defendant’s excessive lifestyle, the court of appeals upheld the sentence because four other acceptable reasons existed that supported the upward departure.

Part K Departures

§5K1.1 Substantial Assistance to Authorities (Policy Statement)

United States v. Cooper, 274 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2001). “A district court has almost complete discretion to determine the extent of a departure under §5K1.1. The district court also has almost complete discretion to deny the government’s §5K1.1 motion.” *Id.* at 248 (citations omitted). “‘Absent a motion for downward departure made by the [g]overnment, a sentencing court is without authority to grant a downward departure on the basis of substantial assistance under § 5K1.1.’” *Id.* at 249 (citations omitted).

United States v. Desselle, 450 F.3d 179 (5th Cir. 2006). “Although judges have latitude under §5K1.1, they must ‘conduct[] a judicial inquiry into each individual case before independently determining the propriety and extent of any departure in the imposition of sentence.’ Section 5K1.1 requires the court to state its reasons for imposing the departure, reasons ‘that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following:’

- (1) the court’s evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant’s assistance, taking into consideration the government’s evaluation of the assistance rendered;
- (2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant;
- (3) the nature and extent of the defendant’s assistance;
- (4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance;
- (5) the timeliness of the defendant’s assistance.

Although the enumerated reasons are not the only factors a court may consider in determining the extent of the §5K1.1 departure, a court must begin to assess a § 5K1.1 departure using the criteria

listed by the Guidelines. Further, the additional factors a court may consider must be related to determining the ‘nature, extent, and significance of assistance.’ We thus join the majority of circuits in holding that the extent of a § 5K1.1 or § 3553(e) departure must be based solely on assistance-related concerns.” *Desselle*, 450 F.3d at 182 (citations omitted).

United States v. Johnson, 33 F.3d 8 (5th Cir. 1994). “When the government files a section 5K1.1 motion, the sentencing court may depart below the guideline range if it finds that substantial assistance was rendered to the government. The propriety and extent of the departure must be determined by the court, based on its evaluation of the facts and circumstances of the case. The government’s evaluation and recommendation, while deserving substantial weight, is but one factor to be considered in this equation. As the commentary to section 5K1.1 explains, ‘[t]he nature, extent, and significance of assistance can involve a broad spectrum of conduct that must be evaluated by the court on an individual basis.’ Thus, when ruling on a section 5K1.1 motion, the sentencing court must exercise its independent judgment and discretion first to determine whether departure is warranted and, finding such, the extent of that departure. In doing so the court is free to deny departure or to grant a departure which is greater or smaller than that recommended by the government.” *Id.* at 9-10 (footnoted citations omitted). “The court is charged with conducting a judicial inquiry into each individual case before independently determining the propriety and extent of any departure in the imposition of sentence. While giving appropriate weight to the government’s assessment and recommendation, the court must consider all other factors relevant to this inquiry.” *Id.* at 10 (footnoted citations omitted).

United States v. Solis, 169 F.3d 224 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 528 U.S. 843 (1999). Persuaded by the Third Circuit’s reasoning in *United States v. Abuhouran*, 161 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 1998), *cert. denied*, 526 U.S. 1077 (1999), the Fifth Circuit held that §5K2.0 does not give district courts any additional authority to consider substantial assistance departures without a government motion. Because the government did not bargain away its discretion to refuse to offer a §5K1.1 motion and the defendant did not allege that the government refused to offer the motion for unconstitutional reasons, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred by granting a five-level downward departure.³

³There is a circuit split on the issue of the appropriate standard of review of a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion. Some circuits hold that relief is warranted *only* when the refusal is based on an unconstitutional motive, and others hold that relief is *also* warranted when the refusal is not rationally related to any legitimate government interest. Compare *United States v. Solis*, 169 F.3d 224, 226 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 528 U.S. 843 (1999) (relief is only granted when refusal is based on unconstitutional motive), *United States v. Bagnoli*, 7 F.3d 90, 92 (6th Cir. 1993), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 827 (1994) (same), and *United States v. Nealy*, 232 F.3d 825, 831 (11th Cir. 2000), *cert. denied*, 534 U.S. 1023 (2001) (same), with *United States v. Sandoval*, 204 F.3d 283, 286 (1st Cir. 2000), (relief is granted when the refusal is based on "an unconstitutional motive or the lack of a rational relationship to any legitimate governmental objective."), *United States v. Brechner*, 99 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1996) (relief is granted when the refusal is based on "some unconstitutional reason"), *United States v. Abuhouran*, 161 F.3d 206, 211-12 (3d Cir. 1998), *cert. denied*, 526 U.S. 1077 (1999) (relief is granted when the refusal is based on an "unconstitutional motive" or "was not rationally related to any legitimate government end"), *United States v. LeRose*, 219 F.3d 335, 342 (4th Cir. 2000) (same), *United States v. Egan*, 966 F.2d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 1992), *cert. denied*, 506 U.S. 1069 (1993) (same), *United States v. Cruz Guerrero*, 194 F.3d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999) (same), *United States v. Duncan*, 242 F.3d 940, 947 (10th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 534 U.S. 858 (2001) (same), and *In re Sealed Case No. 97-3112*, 181 F.3d 128, 142 (D.C. Cir.), *cert. denied*, 528 U.S. 989 (1999) (same).

United States v. Underwood, 61 F.3d 306 (5th Cir. 1995). In considering an issue of first impression, the appellate court held that the promulgation of policy statement §5K1.1 was not an *ultra vires* act of the United States Sentencing Commission. The defendant pled guilty to possession of counterfeit currency. The plea agreement provided that the government retained the discretion whether to file a motion for downward departure for substantial assistance pursuant to §5K1.1. The government did not move for downward departure and the defendant was sentenced to 24 months imprisonment. The defendant argued on appeal that the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority when it promulgated §5K1.1 as a “policy statement” because Congress mandated the creation of a “guideline” in 28 U.S.C. § 994(n). In relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) provides that “[t]he Commission shall assure that the Guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would be otherwise imposed, including a sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a minimum sentence, to take into account a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.” The circuit court noted that Congress’s instructions to the Sentencing Commission fall into four general categories: issue guidelines, issue policy statements, issue guidelines or policy statements or implement a certain congressionally determined policy in the guidelines as a whole. The circuit court recognized that the specific language of each subsection of section 994 determines into which of the four categories the instruction falls. After comparing the language in the subsections dealing with “guidelines” and “policy statements,” the circuit court ruled that Congress was not mandating the promulgation of a specific guideline for downward departure based on substantial assistance in section 994(n). Rather, Congress was instructing that guidelines as a whole should “reflect” the appropriateness of a downward departure based on substantial assistance. The circuit court went on to address §5K1.1 and its relationship to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), and noted its previous ruling in *United States v. Beckett*, 996 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1993) where the dispositive issue was “whether section 3553(e) and §5K1.1 provide separate and distinct methods of departure or whether they are intended to perform the same function.” *Id.* at 72. The Fifth Circuit concluded that “[b]ased on a combined reading of §5K1.1, section 3553(e) and section 994(n)], . . . there is a direct statutory relationship between §5K1.1 and section 3553(e) of such character to make §5K1.1 the appropriate vehicle by which section 3553(e) may be implemented.” *Id.* The circuit court noted that because it had held §5K1.1 to be an appropriate vehicle to implement a statute, by definition, the Sentencing Commission did not exceed the authority given to it by Congress when it enacted §5K1.1.

§5K2.0 Grounds for Departure (Policy Statement)

United States v. Barrera-Saucedo, 385 F.3d 533 (5th Cir. 2004), *cert. denied*, 543 U.S. 1080 (2005). “[I]t is permissible for a sentencing court to grant a downward departure to an illegal alien for all or part of time served in state custody from the time immigration authorities locate the defendant until he is taken into federal custody. *Id.* at 537.

United States v. Castillo, 386 F.3d 632 (5th Cir. 2004), *cert. denied*, *Acuna-Cuadros v. United States*, 543 U.S. 1029 (2004). The defendant, convicted of being unlawfully in United States after deportation, was granted a downward departure based on cultural assimilation. The defendant had lived in the United States since age three; continuously lived in the United States; was educated and worked here; and was fluent in English. The Fifth Circuit, reviewing the departure for plain error, affirmed. There was evidence to support the departure.

United States v. Phillips, 382 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2004). “[A] district court may impose a sentence of imprisonment below a statutory minimum for a drug crime only if: (1) the Government makes a motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) asserting the defendant’s substantial assistance to the Government; or (2) the defendant meets the ‘safety valve’ criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).” *Id.* at 499. In this case, the district court departed from the mandatory minimum sentence relying in part on the Supreme Court’s decision in *Koon v. United States*, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). On appeal, the defendant argued that *Koon* authorized the district court to depart downward from the minimum statutory sentence. The court of appeals rejected the argument, explaining that *Koon* did not address cases in which Congress limited the discretion of the sentencing court by requiring the imposition of a specific sentence.

United States v. Froman, 355 F.3d 882 (5th Cir. 2004). If a factor for departure is not mentioned by the guidelines, the court can depart if it considers the structure and theory of relevant individual guidelines and the guidelines as a whole and then decides the factor takes the case out of the heartland. Here, the defendant challenged an upward departure. He was charged with conspiracy to knowingly transport, receive, and distribute child pornography in interstate commerce via the computer; receipt of child pornography in interstate commerce via computer; and possession of child pornography transported in interstate commerce via computer. At sentencing, the district court gave a two level enhancement under §2G2.1 because one of his victims was between ages twelve and sixteen, and a two level enhancement for the fact that defendant was the parent of one of the exploited victims. The district court also granted a motion for an upward departure under §§5K2.0 and 5K2.8 resulting in an offense level of 34 and in a guideline range of 151-180 months. On appeal, defendant challenged the upward departure, arguing that the basis for the upward departure did not place the case outside the “heartland” of cases under §2G2.1, and that the district court failed to notify defendant of its intention to depart upward. The Fifth Circuit noted that the district court was not required to provide notice of the possibility of departure where the opposing party had so moved. The court further stated that defendant’s substantive objection to the departure was also unpersuasive. In the instant case, the number of images transmitted and the extent of the distribution of images of defendant’s 12-year-old daughter were considered particularly heinous aspects of the crime, and thus placed this case outside the heartland of general child pornography cases. The court noted that the Sentencing Commission had neither forbidden nor discouraged consideration of such factors. The extremity of the conduct was a factor sentencing courts were authorized to consider under §5K2.8. Furthermore, the degrading effect on defendant’s daughter from the mass distribution of these images was not contemplated by §2G2.1. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the sentence.

United States v. Garay, 235 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2000), *cert. denied*, 532 U.S. 986 (2001). A defendant’s status as a deportable alien, “as an element of the crime for which he was sentenced, is not an ‘aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind on degree not adequately taken into consideration by the [Sentencing] Commission’ and therefore is not a permissible basis for departure” in an illegal reentry case. *Id.* at 234. In this case, the appellate court upheld the district court’s refusal to depart downward on the basis of defendant’s alienage. The district court stated that there was nothing “atypical” about defendant’s case that would take it outside the “heartland” of immigration cases to which the guideline applied. The cases upon which defendant relied were noted by the court of appeals as cases which involved aliens convicted of crimes other than immigration cases. The court determined that defendant’s status as a deportable

alien, as an inherent element of his crime, has already been considered by the Commission in formulating the applicable guideline.

United States v. Grosenheider, 200 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 2000). In determining whether a case falls outside of the heartland so as to warrant a departure from the Guidelines, the sentencing court must consider the following questions: ““(1) What features of this case, potentially, take it outside the Guidelines’ ‘heartland’ and make it a special, or unusual case? [;] (2) Has the Sentencing Commission forbidden departure based on those features? [;] (3) If not, has the Commission encouraged departures based on those features? [; and] (4) If not, has the Commission discouraged departures based on those features?”” *Id.* at 331 (quoting *Koon v. United States*, 518 U.S. 81, 95 (1996)). In this case, the court of appeals found that the district court did not articulate an acceptable reason for a downward departure. First, the court of appeals explained that the district court’s disagreement with the guidelines was not an acceptable basis for departure. Second, the court of appeals explained that the case did not fall out of the “heartland” of possession-of-child-pornography cases simply because the defendant did not have a record of harm to others, his relevant conduct did not include harm to others, and he did not have a propensity to molest children. The court of appeals stated that the fact that the defendant “had not abused any child, and had no inclination, predisposition or tendency to do so, and had not produced or distributed any child pornography, and had no inclination, predisposition, or tendency to do so, [did] not suffice to take his case out of the heartland” possession-of-child-pornography cases. *Id.* at 334.

United States v. Fonts, 95 F.3d 372 (5th Cir. 1996). In this case, the Fifth Circuit joined the First, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits in holding that a district court can not depart based on the disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine. The circuit court noted that granting a downward departure based on the disparity between the penalties for crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses would second-guess Congress’s authority. The court stated: “it is not the province of this court to second guess Congress’s chosen penalty. That is a discretionary legislative judgment for Congress and the Sentencing Commission to make.” *Fonts*, 95 F.3d at 374 (quoting *United States v. Cherry*, 50 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 1995)). The circuit court added: “[t]his court, as well as others, has declined to question the penalties for crack cocaine chosen by Congress, and we refuse to do so in this instance.” Thus, the court concluded that the defendant’s disparate impact argument must fail. *Id.* at 374.

United States v. Gonzales-Balderas, 11 F.3d 1218 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 511 U.S. 1129 (1994). The district court did not err in refusing to depart downward from life imprisonment. The court concluded that the life sentence was a necessary deterrent given the vast profits the defendant was likely to gain in his role as middle manager in the conspiracy.

United States v. Rodriguez-Montelongo, 263 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 2001). The guidelines allow for certain factors not considered by the Commission to be used as a basis for a departure. *Id.* at 432; *see* Ch. 1, pt. A, intro comment. 4(b). In this case, the Court of Appeals explained that cultural assimilation is a factor not mentioned in the guidelines that is sufficient to allow the case to be taken out of the heartland of the particular guideline.

§5K2.1 Death (Policy Statement)

United States v. Davis, 30 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 1994), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 1098 (1995). “A district court is not required to find that all of the §5K2.1 factors exist in order to impose an upward departure. “The only ‘mandatory’ language in the section is that the judge ‘must’ consider matters that ‘normally distinguish among levels of homicide,’ such as state of mind.” *Davis*, 30 F.3d at 615-16 (citations omitted). In this case, an employee of one of the gas stations the defendant robbed suffered an aneurysm at the base of her brain as a result of the trauma of robbery. The defendant argued that although the employee subsequently died, none of the §5K2.1 factors applied to his case. The circuit court concluded that a §5K2.1 upward departure still may be warranted absent a finding that all the factors exist since “[t]he only mandatory ‘language in the section is that the judge must’ consider matters that, normally distinguish among levels of homicide, such as state of mind.” *Id.* at 615-16. The district court specifically considered the mandatory factors when it concluded that although the defendant did not intend to kill the employee, he should have anticipated that his conduct could result in serious injury or death. The circuit court additionally rejected the defendant’s argument that the consecutive sentences he received on the firearms counts adequately accounted for the employee’s death.

United States v. Singleton, 49 F.3d 129 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 516 U.S. 924 (1995). In this opinion, the Fifth Circuit explained that the four-level enhancement for permanent or life threatening injury awarded under §2B3.1(b)(3)(C) does not preclude an upward departure for the death of the victim. *See United States v. Billingsley*, 978 F.2d 861, 865-66 (5th Cir. 1992), *cert. denied*, 507 U.S. 1010 (1993).

§5K2.3 Extreme Psychological Injury (Policy Statement)

United States v. Hefferon, 314 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2002). “Section 5K2.3 provides,

If a victim or victims suffered psychological injury much more serious than that normally resulting from commission of the offense, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range. The extent of the increase ordinarily should depend on the severity of the psychological injury and the extent to which the injury was intended or knowingly risked.

Normally, psychological injury would be sufficiently severe to warrant application of this adjustment only when there is a substantial impairment of the intellectual, psychological, emotional, or behavioral functioning of a victim, when the impairment is likely to be of an extended or continuous duration, and when the impairment manifests itself by physical or psychological symptoms or by changes in behavior patterns. The court should consider the extent to which such harm was likely, given the nature of the defendant’s conduct.

[Prior to this appeal, the Fifth Circuit stated that ‘[a] psychological injury is sufficiently severe where there exists (1) a substantial impairment of the intellectual, psychological, emotional, or behavioral functioning of a victim, (2) which is of an extended or continuous duration, and (3) which manifests itself by physical or psychological symptoms or by changes in behavior patterns.’” *Hefferon* 314 F.3d at 228 (citations omitted).

In this case, the court of appeals upheld an upward departure based upon the extreme psychological injury suffered by a seven-year-old sexual abuse victim who was forced to squeeze the defendant's "private" and to place his penis in her mouth. The victim's treatment manager testified that the victim will suffer long-term psychological effects, such as lack of trust (especially of adults) that are excessively severe. The doctor indicated that the victim's trauma was the most severe of anybody she had ever worked with. When asked to talk about the incident, the victim became physically ill—crying, vomiting, and fever—which is similar to those suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.

CHAPTER SIX: *Sentencing Procedures and Plea Agreements*

Part A Sentencing Procedures

§6A1.3 Resolution of Disputed Factors (Policy Statement)

United States v. Londono, 285 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2002). "[A] defendant challenging the findings of the [Presentence Report] . . . bears the burden of showing that the information in the [Presentence Report] 'cannot be relied on because it is materially untrue, inaccurate, or unreliable.' In general, the [Presentence Report] bears 'sufficient indicia of reliability to be considered as evidence' by the district court, 'especially when there is no evidence in rebuttal.'" *Londono*, 285 F.3d at 354. Here, the defendant claimed that a California conviction he committed as a juvenile should not have been calculated into his criminal history category. The evidence demonstrating the validity of the conviction was its presence in the PSR and the probation officer's testimony that she gathered the information about the conviction from a Texas "rap sheet." The defendant claimed that the rap sheet was unverified and was not the proper place for his juvenile conviction to appear. The Fifth Circuit held that the defendant failed to bear the burden of showing that the information in the PSR "cannot be relied on because it is materially untrue, inaccurate, or unreliable," necessary to successfully challenge the findings of a PSR.

United States v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 721 (5th Cir. 2001). "Generally, a [Presentence Report] bears sufficient indicia of reliability to permit the district court to rely on it at sentencing. 'The [Presentence Report], however, cannot just include statements, in the hope of converting such statements into reliable evidence, without providing any information for the basis of the statements.' Normally, the defendant has the burden to show that the information relied on in a [Presentence Report] is inaccurate. The rebuttal evidence presented by the defendant must show that the [Presentence Report's] information is materially untrue, inaccurate or unreliable. . . . [But] when a use immunity agreement is involved, and the defendant questions the sources of the evidence used against him at sentencing, the burden is on the government to show that the evidence is from outside sources." *Taylor*, 277 F.3d at 724-26 (citations omitted).

United States v. Williams, 22 F.3d 580 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 951 (1994). An indictment standing alone may not be considered in the sentencing analysis. In this opinion, the Fifth Circuit explained as follows:

An indictment is merely a charge and does not constitute evidence of guilt. That elementary rubric has long been a bedrock of instructions provided to jurors on voir dire examination and again in the final charge. It would be ill-advised to discard this principle in sentencing procedures. Grand juries enjoy broad latitude in the conduct of their proceedings, free from restrictive evidentiary rules and other protective incidents of our treasured adversary proceedings. Such latitude to grand juries is acceptable because the consequences of an erroneous indictment are tempered before or at trial. No such safeguard inures to a count which has been dismissed, as in the instant case.

Williams, 22 F.3d at 582.

Part B Plea Agreements

§6B1.2 Standards for Acceptance of Plea Agreements (Policy Statement)

United States v. Foy, 28 F.3d 464 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 1031 (1994). “No statute nor any of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Sentencing Guidelines require a statement of reasons for rejecting a plea agreement. Certainly the better practice would be for the district court to expressly state its reasons. . . . [I]nstead . . . a district court’s decision to reject a plea agreement is proper as long as the record as a whole renders the basis of the decision reasonably apparent to the reviewing court and a decision on that basis is within the district court’s discretion.” *Foy*, 28 F.3d at 472. In this appeal, the defendant complained that the district court rejected his plea agreement because he refused to admit to the relevant conduct alleged in the Presentence Report, but the Government maintained that the district court rejected the agreement based on its belief that the bargained-for sentence was too lenient. The Fifth Circuit explained that a district court “may properly reject a plea agreement based on undue leniency” and that “absent some special circumstance it would ordinarily be an abuse of discretion for a court to reject a plea agreement based on a defendant’s refusal to acquiesce in the findings of a Presentence Report.” *Id.* The Fifth Circuit reasoned that because §6A1.3 gives a defendant the right to object to the Presentence Report, “a district court decision to reject a plea agreement based on a defendant objecting to a [Presentence Report] and refusing to admit culpability for other offenses, would normally constitute unjustifiable coercion of a defendant to forgo his right to object to a [Presentence Report] in order to preserve his plea bargain.” *Id.* The Fifth Circuit declined to adopt a “hard and fast rule” that required the district court to expressly state its reasons for rejecting a plea agreement.” Instead, the Fifth Circuit explained, it will uphold the district court’s decision to reject a plea agreement “as long as the record as a whole renders the basis of the decision reasonably apparent to the reviewing court and a decision on that basis is within the district court’s discretion.” *Id.*

CHAPTER SEVEN: *Violations of Probation and Supervised Release*

Part B Probation and Supervised Release Violations

§7B1.3 Revocation of Probation or Supervised Release (Policy Statement)

United States v. Mathena, 23 F.3d 87 (5th Cir. 1994). “That Congress gave the Sentencing Commission the choice to issue guidelines or policy statements evidences Congress’ intent that the policy statements regarding the revocation of supervised release be advisory only. That the Sentencing Commission itself termed the provisions of Chapter 7 ‘advisory policy statements’ which would provide ‘greater flexibility to both the Commission and the courts,’ bolsters the view that the policy statements of Chapter 7 were intended to be advisory only.” *Mathena*, 23 F.3d at 92.

United States v. Moody, 277 F.3d 719 (5th Cir. 2001). “[Title 18,] [s]ection 3583(h) authorizes a court, upon revocation of a defendant’s supervised release, to impose a new term of supervised release to follow a term of imprisonment. Section 3583(h), however, limits the duration of supervised release a court can impose [to] [t]he length of such a term of supervised release shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.” *Moody*, 277 F.3d at 720.

United States v. Stiefel, 207 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000). In this appeal, the defendant argued “that the district court did not have authority pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) & (h) to incarcerate him for a second violation of supervised release because those provisions do not speak of second revocations. Section 3583(e)(3) states, in pertinent part, that ‘[t]he court may . . . revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term of supervised release without credit for time previously served on postrelease supervision . . . ,’ while § 3583(h) allows the district court the leeway of combining prison time and supervised release when resentencing a defendant who violates supervised release. Although neither provision mentions second or further revocations, they do permit more than one revocation of supervised release. The grant of statutory authority in § 3583(e) refers to the district court’s general power to revoke a term of supervised release after considering certain factors. Hence, the issue under § 3583(e) is not whether a second revocation may occur, but whether the district court, after considering certain factors, believes that revocation is appropriate for a defendant on supervised release. If a defendant is on supervised release and the district court believes that revocation is appropriate pursuant to § 3583(e)(3), then the district court may require the defendant to serve prison time.” *Stiefel*, 207 F.3d at 260. The court of appeals determined that was what occurred in this case and determined that the district court did not err.

§7B1.4 Term of Imprisonment (Policy Statement)

United States v. Giddings, 37 F.3d 1091 (5th Cir. 1994), *cert. denied*, 514 U.S. 1008 (1995). “Under the sentencing guidelines, if the minimum term of imprisonment required by the statute exceeds the maximum term of imprisonment under §7B1.4(a), then section 7B1.4(b)(2) provides that the statutory minimum shall be substituted for the applicable range.” *Giddings*, 37 F.3d at 1093. “For purposes of an initial sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sets out the relevant factors to be used by the district court to fashion a defendant’s sentence. Although the district judge is required to review the § 3553(a) factors in determining the sentence, the court has limited

discretion in the factors it can use to determine whether to impose a term of imprisonment. Typically, a person's need for rehabilitation cannot be used to determine whether a sentence of imprisonment is imposed." *Id.* "In contrast, when initially determining the period of supervised release, the district court must consider the § 3553(a) factors, therefore the defendant's need for rehabilitation is necessarily taken into account. If supervised release is subsequently revoked under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the statute also requires that the § 3553(a) factors be considered. However, when revocation of supervised release is mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), the statute does not require consideration of the § 3553(a) factors." *Id.* at 1095. "When revoking supervised release the district judge is not resentencing the defendant. The type and the term of the sentence has already been determined by the sentencing judge. The supervising district judge is bound by the sentence previously imposed, and at revocation is merely converting all or a portion of the supervised release period into a term of imprisonment. Given the limited discretion available to the supervising district judge, and the fact that the sentencing range is fixed by statute, consideration of the § 3553(a) factors may be appropriate to fashion a sentence conforming to the purpose and intent of the original sentence, and that is within the boundaries established by the sentencing judge." *Id.* at 1096. In this appeal, the court of appeals determined that "the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g), and the purposes and intent behind the statute, is best served by permitting a district judge to consider a defendant's need for rehabilitation in arriving at a specific sentence of imprisonment upon revocation of supervised release." *Id.* at 1097.

See United States v. Mathena, 23 F.3d 87 (5th Cir. 1994), §7B1.3, p. 56.

FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 32

United States v. Andrews, 390 F.3d 840 (5th Cir. 2004). "The touchstone of rule 32 is reasonable notice, so the fact that the [sentencing] court [does] not specifically delineate that it would use [particular] factors should not make the notice defective; . . . mentioning factors in the context of upward departure notice puts the factors "in play" so as to allow [defense] counsel adequately to prepare for sentencing. On the other hand, the court fail[s] to give adequate notice of other factors ultimately used in calculating an upward departure, by failing to reference them at all at the initial hearing when the notice of upward departure was given. The . . . argument[] that sufficient notice was given as a result of the court's generally discussing 'victim-related' and 'offense-related' factors . . . goes against the plain meaning of rule 32(h), requiring that the court ". . . specify any ground on which the court is contemplating a departure." Allowing the court broadly to open the door to use any victim- or offense-related departure factor merely by mentioning one when notice of departure is given, provides defense counsel no guidance and thus tramples on the objectives of rule 32(h)" In this appeal, the court of appeals determined that "even though the sentencing court gave notice of most of the grounds that ultimately were used for departure, it still was error not to give notice of all that were considered, because the plain text of rule 32(h) commands the court to '. . . specify any ground . . .'" *Andrews*, 390 F.3d at 845-46.

United States v. Chung, 261 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2001). "Rule 32(c)(1) only requires the district court to make findings on timely objections and on objections that it considers in its

discretion.” *Chung*, 261 F.3d at 539. In this appeal, the defendant complained that the district court erred by failing to consider the supplemental objections to the PSR that he filed on the day of his sentencing hearing. The court of appeals determined that the supplemental objections were distinct from the defendant’s earlier objections and that district court was free to disregard them because they were untimely.

United States v. Myers, 150 F.3d 459 (5th Cir. 1998). “By its own terms, Rule 32 mandates that a defendant be given the opportunity ‘to make a statement and [] present any information in mitigation of sentence.’” *Myers*, 150 F.3d at 462 (citation omitted). “[I]n order to satisfy the command of Rule 32(c)(3)(C), the court, the prosecutor, and the defendant must at the very least interact in a manner that shows clearly and convincingly that the defendant knew he had a right to speak on any subject of his choosing prior to the imposition of sentence.” *Id.* at 462.

United States v. Reyna, 331 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2003). “This [Fifth Circuit] has determined that a defendant is entitled to the right of allocution at sentencing following the revocation of supervised release.” *Reyna*, 331 F.3d at 451.

OTHER STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS

21 U.S.C. § 841

United States v. Valencia-Gonzales, 172 F.3d 344 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 528 U.S. 894 (1999). A federal defendant’s sentence for drug importation is properly keyed to the identity of the drug the defendant was actually carrying rather than the drug he thought he was carrying. Although the statutory scheme requires specific intent to carry a controlled substance, it imposes a strict liability punishment based on which controlled substance, and how much of it, is involved in the offense. The Court relied on *United States v. Strange*, 102 F.3d 356, 361 (8th Cir. 1996), for the proposition that Congress had a rational basis to conclude that there is some deterrent value in exposing a drug trafficker to liability for the full consequences, both expected and unexpected, of his own unlawful behavior in sentencing the defendant. Accordingly, the district court did not err in sentencing the defendant according to the drug he was carrying, heroin, rather than the drug he believed he was carrying, cocaine.

POST-BOOKER (UNITED STATES V. BOOKER, 125 S. CT. 738 (2005))

Plain Error

United States v. Cruz, 418 F.3d 481 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 770 (2005) The court held that the defendant demonstrated plain error when the district court stated that granting the defendant’s downward departure motion would require deviating from the guidelines, and the district court commented that there was nothing anyone could do to help.

United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 43 (2005). The court explained that where the appellant fails to challenge the constitutionality of the guidelines

below, the court of appeals will review for plain error. To demonstrate plain error, the appellant must show that the sentencing court would have reached a significantly different result under an advisory sentencing scheme).

United States v. Martinez-Lugo, 411 F.3d 597 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 464 (2005). The court decided that the district court's application of the guidelines as mandatory is not structural error.

Harmless Error

United States v. Akpan, 407 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2005). The court explained that even though the defendant did not specifically mention the Sixth Amendment, *Apprendi*, or *Blakely* in the district court, his objections during sentencing to the court's determinations about financial losses that were not proven at trial was sufficient to preserve *Booker* argument.

United States v. Pineiro, 410 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2005). The court applied the harmless error standard because the defendant objected below. The *Apprendi*-based objection to the Presentence Report's drug-quantity calculations is sufficient to preserve a *Booker* claim because the challenge was based on the same constitutional violation addressed by both cases.

United States v. Saldana, 427 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2005), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 1097 (2006). The court found that the government demonstrated harmless error where the sentencing court "stated that, in the event that the *Booker* decision should hold the federal sentencing guidelines unconstitutional, the court would sentence him to the same amount of imprisonment and supervised release permitted under the substantive statutes."

United States v. Thibodaux, 147 F. Appx. 405 (5th Cir. 2005), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 1087 (2006). The court held that an objection that the amounts of loss and restitution were overstated or unsupported does not preserve a *Booker* error.

United States v. Walters, 418 F.3d 461 (5th Cir. 2005). The court concluded that the government failed to show harmless error when the district court indicated that the guidelines sentence was too harsh and that it would impose a lesser sentence if the guidelines were declared unconstitutional.

United States v. Woods, 440 F.3d 255 (5th Cir. 2006). "When a Sixth Amendment claim under *Booker* 'is preserved in the district court by an objection, we will ordinarily vacate the sentence and remand, unless we can say the error is harmless under [R]ule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.'" (Citations omitted.)

United States v. Woods, 440 F.3d 255 (5th Cir. 2006). "[W]here the Government's principal evidence is a sentence at the top of the range determined by the guidelines under a mandatory sentencing regime, the Government has not carried its burden."

Departures

United States v. Castillo, 430 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 2005). “[A]fter *Booker*, we continue to review a district court’s findings of fact in relation to the Guidelines for clear error.”

United States v. Jones, 444 F.3d 430 (5th Cir. 2006), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 2958 (2006). “We are persuaded that *Booker* does not alter the way in which an upward departure is reviewed under § 3742(f)(2) for plain error. The remedial opinion in *Booker* did not sever or excise 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(3), which directs that a court of appeals ‘shall affirm [a] sentence’ unless it is ‘described in paragraph (1) or (2)’ of § 3553(f). We are to reverse and remand an upward departure from a [g]uidelines range that was ‘based on an impermissible factor’ only ‘if [the court of appeals] determines that the sentence is too high.’ The statutory ‘too high’ requirement is the equivalent of the ‘unreasonableness’ standard set forth in *Booker*.”) (citations omitted).

United States v. Saldana, 427 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2005), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 810 (2006). “[W]e now evaluate the district court’s decision to depart upwardly and the extent of that departure for abuse of discretion”

Reasonableness

United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551 (5th Cir. 2006). “We agree with our sister circuits that have held that a sentence within a properly calculated [g]uideline range is presumptively reasonable. . . . We . . . decline [however] to find a properly calculated [g]uidelines sentence reasonable *per se*.”

United States v. Armendariz, 451 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2006). The court determined that a sentence that reflected the mandatory minimum sentence for a sex offense involving the internet and a minor was unreasonable because it did not include a term of supervised release.

United States v. Dock, 426 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 2005), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 1160 (2006). “After *Booker*, where the sentencing [court] imposes a sentence within a properly calculated guidelines range, we will generally find the sentence reasonable.”

United States v. Guidry, 462 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2006) The court vacated a sentence that was almost 50% lower than the guideline minimum, finding that the district court made clearly erroneous factual determinations that “infected the district court’s balancing of the section 3553(a) factors and provide an insufficient basis for imposing a non-Guideline sentence,” gave significant weight to irrelevant factors like defendant’s support of his family and “less than perfect counsel,” and ignored factors (defendant disparity) that should have been given significant weight.

United States v. Nikonova, 2007 WL 575817 (5th Cir. Feb. 26, 2007). “To apply the [reasonableness] test in the same manner to guideline sentences and non-guideline sentences alike, however, would ignore the presumption of reasonableness that applies to guideline sentences and would disregard the discretion appropriately afforded to a district court where it has considered all the § 3553(a) factors. Therefore, the presumption of reasonableness that attaches to a properly calculated guideline sentence is rebutted only where the sentence falls so far afoul of one of the standards in *Smith* as to constitute a clear error in the court’s exercise of its broad sentencing discretion.”

United States v. Roush, 466 F.3d 380 (5th Cir. 2006) The court vacated a below-guideline sentence as unreasonable in a tax evasion case, due to the district court’s reliance on an impermissible factor, the later loss of value of the unreported stocks; defendant’s appeal of an unreasonably enhanced sentence was used to hold that actual sentence was unreasonably reduced.

United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704 (5th Cir. 2006). “The farther a sentence varies from the applicable [g]uideline sentence, ‘the more compelling the justification based on factors in section 3553(a)’ must be. . . . A non-[g]uideline sentence unreasonably fails to reflect the statutory sentencing factors where it (1) does not account for a factor that should have received significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or (3) represents a clear error of judgment in balancing the sentencing factors.” (Internal citations omitted).

United States v. Smith, 440 F.3d 704 (5th Cir. 2006). The court explained that a guideline sentence that includes a departure pursuant to the guidelines is still reviewed as a guideline sentence because the authority to depart derives from the guidelines.

Unwarranted Disparities

United States v. Aguirre-Villa, 460 F.3d 681 (5th Cir. 2006). “The refusal to factor in, when sentencing a defendant, the sentencing disparity caused by early disposition [fast-track] programs does not render a sentence unreasonable. Section 3553(a)(6) is but one factor in a list of factors to be considered; moreover, the U.S. Sentencing Commission must have thought the disparity warranted when it authorized early disposition programs without altering § 3553(a)(6).”

United States v. Bullock, 454 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 2006). The court stated that comparing codefendants is not usually enough to establish a sentencing disparity for purposes of § 3553(a)(6) and that the kind of disparity with which § 3553(a)(6) addresses is an unjustified difference across judges (or districts) rather than among defendants in a single case.

United States v. Duhon, 440 F.3d 711 (5th Cir. 2006), *petition for cert. filed* (U.S. May 18, 2006) (No. 05-11144). “We agree with the First and Eighth Circuits that a sentencing disparity intended by Congress is not unwarranted. In other words, ‘what counts is the uniformity in sentencing sought by Congress. . . . [S]entencing disparity [between a defendant and a codefendant] produced by substantial assistance departures was intended by Congress and is thus not a proper sentencing consideration under section 3553(a)(6).’” (Internal citations omitted).

Procedural Issues

United States v. Caldwell, 448 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2006). “Even after *Booker*, a [Presentence Report] is presumed to be sufficiently reliable such that a district court may properly rely on it during sentencing.”

United States v. Hardin, 437 F.3d 463 (5th Cir. 2006). The court explained that for the court of appeals to review a sentence for reasonableness, the district court must carefully articulate its reasons for the sentence it imposes: “These reasons should be fact specific and

include, for example, aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to personal characteristics of the defendant, his offense conduct, his criminal history, relevant conduct or other facts specific to the case at hand which led the court to conclude that the sentence imposed was fair and reasonable.”

United States v. Luciano-Rodriguez, 442 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2006). “This court reviews the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines *de novo* where, as here, the issue has been preserved in the district court.”

United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 43 (2005). The court requires a sentencing court to carefully consider the guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors.

United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 43 (2005) The court held that, ordinarily, the sentencing court must determine the applicable guideline range in the same manner as before *Booker*; this process includes finding all facts relevant to sentencing using a preponderance of the evidence standard.

United States v. Martin, 431 F.3d 846 (5th Cir. 2005), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 1664 (2006). The court rejected the appellant’s argument that prior convictions must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt because *Almendarez-Torres* has not been overruled.

United States v. Mejia-Huerta, 2007 WL 610973 (5th Cir. Feb. 28, 2007). “[W]e conclude that sentencing courts are not required to give pre-sentencing notice of their sua sponte intention to impose a non-Guidelines sentence, regardless of the pre- *Booker* pronouncements of ... Rule 32(h).”

United States v. Tzep-Mejia, 461 F.3d 522 (5th Cir. 2006). The court held that in certain cases, the sentencing court need not decide which guideline applies and may impose a non-guideline sentence, as long as the possible ranges are considered along with other § 3553(a) factors.

Ex Post Facto

United States v. Charon, 442 F.3d 881 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 127 S.Ct. 260 (2006). The court held that the district court did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause by applying the remedial holding of *Booker* at sentencing.

United States v. Scroggins, 411 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2005). The court rejected the argument that changing from mandatory guidelines to advisory guidelines violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.

Retroactivity

In re Elwood, 408 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2005). The court held that *Booker* does not apply retroactively on collateral review for purposes of a successive § 2255 motion.

United States v. Gentry, 432 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2005). “Because the *Booker* rule does not fall into either of the two *Teague* exceptions for non-retroactivity, we determine that *Booker* does not apply retroactively on collateral review to a federal prisoner’s initial 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.”

Revocation

United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d 114 (5th Cir. 2005), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 1804 (2006). The court held that a defendant is not entitled to have a jury determine the facts giving rise to the revocation of supervised release or the facts that underlie the duration of the sentence upon revocation.

Waiver of Right to Appeal Sentence

United States v. Burns, 433 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2005). “[A]n otherwise valid appeal waiver is not rendered invalid, or inapplicable to an appeal seeking to raise a *Booker* or *Fanfan* issue (whether or not that issue would have substantive merit), merely because the waiver was made before *Booker*.”

But see United States v. Harris, 434 F.3d 767 (5th Cir. 2005), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 1897 (2006) (“The sentence ‘Defendant reserves the right to appeal a sentence in excess of the [g]uidelines’ does not unambiguously waive a complaint that the wrong guidelines were applied, and any ambiguity must be construed in favor of the defendant’s right to appeal. . . . The phrase ‘in excess of the [g]uidelines’ does not clearly establish that the defendant agreed that inapplicable guidelines would be the benchmark by which his right to appeal would be measured.”); *United States v. Reyes-Celestino*, 443 F.3d 451 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006) (determining that the appellant did not waive his *Fanfan* error where he “explicitly consent[ed] to be sentenced pursuant to the applicable [s]entencing [g]uidelines” because the “plea agreement [did] not specify whether [the defendant] consented to a mandatory or advisory application of the . . . [g]uidelines”).

United States v. McKinney, 406 F.3d 744 (5th Cir. 2005) the court held that an appeal waiver in which the defendant waived the right to appeal unless the district court upwardly departed from the guidelines remains valid post-*Booker*.

Forfeiture

United States v. Washington, 131 F. App’x 976 (5th Cir. 2005). The court held that a defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to have a jury decide a disputed forfeiture issue.

Restitution

United States v. Garza, 429 F.3d 165 (5th Cir. 2005), *cert. denied*, 126 S. Ct. 1444 (2006).
“[J]udicial fact-finding supporting restitution orders does not violate the Sixth Amendment.”